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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Explaining. terrorism is a very problematic issue, 
defying general agreement about its meaning. The subject of 
terrorism is very emotive which necessarily reflects itself 
on the analytical horizons of conceptualization of 
terrorism. Although it still remains a controversial 
subject but the greater convergence of academic and 
scholarlv views is on its increasing recognition, that it is 
a technigue of applying violence; a way of carrying out 
violence to the adversary, who may be politically, 
economically and above all militarily stronger than the 
practitioners of terrorism. It is a kind of unconventional 
warfare. in which violence necessarilv possesses the 
elements of terror, thereby achieving the political 
objectives. 
This studv "Terrorism as a political techniaue in 
India". also looks upon the subject as a means to an end. 
not an end in itself. It is violence which is consciously 
carried out for political purposes. It is a political 
techniaue for achieving political ends. As the subject of 
this study indicates, the focus is on India. Attempts have 
been made to analyse the phenomenon of terrorism as a 
political technigue. in the pre and the post independent 
India. In the overall perspective it looks on terrorism as 
a political techniaue. 
II 
The First Chapter definition, concept and nature of 
terrorism of this studv deals with the subject of terrorism. 
It endeavours to analyse the conceptual problems associated 
with the concept. its nature and characteristics. 
The Second Chapter ore-Independence history of terrorism 
in India, Attempt to look at the use of terrorism as a 
political technique in pre-independence time mainly covering 
the freedom struggle. 
The Third Chapter terrorism in post independent India 
analyses the employment of terrorism as a means for 
political ends in post independent India, basically focusing-
on the terrorism of Punjab, Kashmir and the North Eastern 
region of the country. 
The Study is based on the published sources. depending 
mainly on the secondary sources. No originality in the 
interpretations of given facts is being claimed, the purpose 
basically is to understand the employment of terrorism as a 
means to an end. specifically in India. 
It is a humble attempt to understand the problem, not 
being presumptions of offering any solutions which are 




A Conceptual Analysis 
Terrorism is a very problematic phenomenon defying 
general agreement among scholars and its analysts. 
Although. the scholars have extensively written on the 
subject, but it continues to be the subject matter of debate 
and discussion. The vagueness with which the term terrorism 
is used is the major source which proves problematic when it 
comes to academic analysis. It is so loosely used to 
describe the variety of acts of violence that it has become 
pezorative these days. Some governments are prone to lable 
as terrorism, all violent acts committed by thier political 
opponents, while anti government extremists freauently claim 
to be the victimes government terror. What is called 
terrorism, thus seems to depend on point of view. Use of 
the term implies a moral judgement and if one party attaches 
the lable terrorists to its opponent, then it indirectly 
persuades others to adopt the moral view point. This is the 
primary controversy which prevails upon the academic 
discussion and scholarly. A person studying the phenomenon 
of terrorism inadvertently injects his own value judgement 
in to the analysis . Therefore its conceptualization in a 
value free language is next to impossible. However it is 
pertinent here to analyse the concept of terrorism to 
understand its meaning and nature. 
1. Brian M. Jenkins. "International Terrorism i A New Mode 
of Conflict", in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (»d.) 
International Terrorism and World Security. Croom Helm, 
London, 1975. Also See IDR Research Team. "Punjab : 
Profile of a Terrorist Movement", Indian Defence Review. 
Vol. II, No. 2, January 1987, p. 121. 
The concept of terrorism is associated with the 
origin of modern democracy. The word, originally French, 
became part of the English political langauge <1785) after 
the Reign of terror. It meant a system of terror and 
referred to the activities of a government "government by 
intimidation, a policy intended to strike with terror those 
against whom it is adopted""*-. After words the word took on 
new meanings. By the 1890's, a terrorist was a rebel, who 
attempted to destroy a system by assassinating its major 
office holders. Dominant concerns of a particular period, 
determines the subsequent usage. After the rise of the 
totalitarian regimes in the 1930's terrorism was most often 
referred to the practice of those states, but by the 1950's 
it became identified almost exclusively with rebel's again. 
The meaning of the term 'Terrorism' has depended on the 
dominant concerns of the particular periods. 
Terrorism is a kind of violence undertaken to 
influence the political behaviour. The encyclopaedia of 
Social Sciences defines terrorism as "a term used to 
describe the method or theory whereby an organised group or 
party seeks to achieve its avowed aims chiefly through the 
systematic use of violence".^. It is also seen as use of 
violence and threats to intimidate or coerce, especially for 
2. David C. Rapoport, "Terrorism", in Encyclopaedia of 
Sovernment and Politics. Vol. 2, Marry Hawkesiworth 
(ed.) Routledge, London, 1992. 
3. Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences. Vol. 13 - 14, 1968, 
pp. 575-579. 
political purpose*. Most dictionary definitions of the term 
terrorism commonly means the rule by terror. In the 
twentieth century terrorism, before the end of the Second 
World War. was over whelmingly practiced by the State 
apparatus and in the post war period by the groups opposed 
to the state. Terrorism depends upon the definition of the 
world which the author accepts. Over 90 percent of the 
books and writings on the subject assume that terrorism is 
organised violence against the state. ofcourse with 
political objectives . 
The major complexity still remains with the 
definition of terrorism. In recent years however. a 
surprisingly broad consensus has emerged with regard to the 
definition of terrorism. There is general recognition that 
terrorism is a specific method of struggle6. It can and has 
been employed by an infinite variety of actors in 
international system. including governments, political 
factions, criminal gangs and even religious movements and 
cults. According to this emerging agreement on the meaning 
of terrorism, it becomes a means to an end. not an end in 
itself. In other words, terrorism has objectives. 
Terrorism being a means to an end is a kind of 
warfare. War, literally means a state of conflict, a 
4. American Colleoe Dictionary. 1966. 
5. N.S. Saksena. "Preface", Terrorism History and Facts in 
the World and in India. Abhinav Publications, New Delhi, 
19B5, p. 11. 
6. Alex P. Schmid, Political Terrorism i A Guide to 
Concepts. Theories Data Bases, and Literature. North 
Holland. Publication Company, Amsterdam, 19B3, pp. 5-
159. 
contest between parties carried on by arms. any lone, 
continued struggle, open hostility. Thus wars as are 
understood, were fought with knowledge and understanding of 
the parties involved. Terrorism is interestingly 
consistent with the essence of classical military strategy, 
the efficacious use of force to achieve a desired policy 7. 
Yay Mall in also describes "terrorism as an armed conflict 
which uses violence, causes both material and economic 
damages, it is therefore a kind of armed conflict/war"6. The 
systematic terrorism of Middle East represents a new 
dimension of warfare. The Black September Massacre of the 
Israeli Athlets was fundamentally a military measure because 
having failed in four conventional warfare to defeat the 
enemy, the Palestinians resorted to unconventional warfare 
specially terrorism. For them terrorism has become an 
integrated part of strategy in which there are well defined 
o 
political, economic and military objectives . Moreover the 
adherents or Practitioners of terrorism prefer terming their 
act as war operations against the enemy and consequently if 
captured, they say they should be treated as prisoners of 
war rather than as convicted criminals. Although states 
7. Brian M. Jenkins, International Terrorism : Trend and 
Potentialities. Rand Carp, California 1977, p. 38, also 
See, K. Subrahmanyam, "Terrorism : to the Forefront of 
the Stage, Strategic Analysis. Vol. 10, No. 3, June 
1986, p. 240. 
B. Yay Mallin, "Terrorism as a Military Weapon, in Mariusk. 
Living Ston, and others (ed.) International Terrorism in 
the Contemporary World. Green Wood Press, London, 1978, 
p. 391. 
9. Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International Air 
Ports Terrorist Act, October, 1983, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1983, pp. 116-117. 
would never accede to this theory of terrorism. They 
(terrorists) remain convinced that they are fighting a war. 
A terrorist sees himself/herself as a soldier, even through 
he may wear no uniform nor necessarily receive any formal 
military training 1". Terrorism thus is the threat of 
violence or series of acts of violence effected through 
surreptious means by an individual, an organisation or a 
people to further his or their political objectives. This 
is therefore a military activity. In this perspective 
terrorism is seen as a weapon of militarily weak short of 
confronting the superior enemy in open combat. This is the 
military weapon through which militarily weak wages war 
against the superior and well orqanised enemy. It is 
essential to specify here that the nature of every 
unconventional warfares <low intensity warfare) like 
guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and revolutionary warfare is 
protracted. So any isolated terrorist incident do not 
qualify to be termed as terrorism. To make it a warfare. 
the threat of occurence of terrorist incidents in future is 
necessary and essential. Terrorism therefore in a generic 
way could be described as that diversity of actions. and 
measures, through which militarily weak carry out violence 
against the strong adversary. It recourses to all possible 
means, tricks strategems and tactics. It is a kind of 
warfare which possesses within itself high degree of 
flexibility and creativity. 
10. Eric Morris, Terrorism 8 Threat and Response. St. 
Martin's Press, New York, 1988, p. 26. 
NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF TERRORISM i 
The emotive nature of the subject matter, the terms 
derogatory thrust and the political discourse are major 
contributory factors to the comlexity of the concept of 
terrorism. It is largely being recognised and considered as 
a technique of applying violence, which in principle can be 
used by any one in all sorts of conflict situations. 
Violence is a generic term which means carrying out the 
damage to the enemy not necessarily having the elements of 
terror. Terrorism is a kind of violence with essential 
elements of terror. This kind of violence is based on the 
philosophy of terror. The philosophy which is very old 
having its roots in the philosophy of a Chinese thinker and 
the great military strategist Sun Tru who philosophised that 
"kill one and frighten ten thousand". The strategic aim is 
to kill one to generate terror in the Psyche of thousands Df 
people. Through this strategy the practitioners try to 
influence the political behaviour of those in authority for 
political purposes. Although terror is an inherent element 
of terrorism. But here the question arises what is the 
difference between terrorism and other kind of violence 
while all violence instill some kind of terror/fear in the 
minds of the people/target. In case of terrorism the acts 
are generally directed against the government on the state 
which is politically, economically and militarily is for 
superior and strong than the terrorists. Terrorism effects 
the general functioning of the society imparing the moral of 
the people, eroding the support base of the government 
demonstrating its weakness, with a view to draw the 
attention of the public and the oovernment alike, towards 
the political objectives, causes and Grievances. The aim is 
to defame and discredit the established order and create 
choose and consfusion in the administrative machinary and 
instill fear in the minds of the general public. Where as 
in cases of violence practiced by mafia kino., underworld, 
the docaits or other kinds of violence, it is not intended 
by the practitioners to create the atmosphere of terror, 
then to obtain their objectives. In terrorism, it is not 
directed against the victims but against those who act as 
road blocks to the cause of terrorism. Putting it 
mathematically means killing A to influence the behaviour of 
B as per the objectives of the terrorists. But in other 
cases killing A does not necessarily mean tD influence the 
behaviour of B. In otehr kinds of violence generally A 
remains the element of terror is significant in terrorism. 
It is for this reason that a terrorists generally undertakes 
those actions, which create the general climate of fear. 
designed to influence the thinking of other human beings 
according to the desire of the practitioners of terrorism. 
If there is a choice between derailment of a goods train 
and a passenger train, a terrorist will prefer the 
derailment of the passenger train as he will be able to 
infuse terror into the minds of the people . So violence 
11. D.P. Sharma, Countering Terrorism. Lancer Books, New 
Delhi, 1992, p.11. 
that can create psychological and emotional effect on the 
masses fall under the purview of terrorism. In anv other 
warfare, violence is the beginning and its consequences are 
the end of it. For terrorist. the consequences of the 
violence are themselves merely a step towards the 
achievement of the objectives. 
The objectives of military operations terrorism arE 
not exactly those of conventional combats causing of 
maximum damage to the enemy but they are more or less same 
in the sense that they also aim at weakening the will of the 
enemy, surrendering to the cause of the terrorist. The 
combating procedures and methods are no doubt. different. 
Terrorists do not try to take and hold ground or physically 
destroy their opponents forces . They usually lack that 
kind of power or having it are constrained from applying it. 
The enemy's rear is the battleground for terrorism. 
Moreover, it has both national and international 
battlefields. It even some times takes place in the 
countries which have no direct or indirect relations either 
with the terrorists or with the enemv against whom the 
terrorist are carrying out violence. 
Terrorism like any other form of law intensity 
warfare believes in the philosophy of to stay alive today to 
fight tomorrow. This necessarily provides justification for 
12. Brian M. Jenkins. Qp.Cit.. p. 15. 
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proroguing the conflict. Moreover, this is subtantiated 
•from the factual believe that the proroguing of the conflict 
proves castly : politically, militarily and economically 
for the adversary and the benifacial for the terrorist who 
long for public support and establishment of their cause and 
credentials. 
Although terrorism also depends on public support but 
its initiation not necessarily requires public support. As 
a matter of fact in majority of terrorist struggles it is 
seen that terrorism is supported by external forces; like 
the terrorism that was in Punjab, terrorism of Kashmir and 
North East. One thing is to be highlighted here is that 
cause of terrorism for which arms are taken up was present 
their in majority of the cases. This cause was exploited by 
the external forces. But in some cases, even the cause was 
created. The point to be made is that terrorism in order to 
continue compulsorily requires both internal and external 
support. Without support its sustenance is not possible. 
For this terrorist delibrately invite the atrocities and 
repression to be committed against the people supporting the 
terrorists as this will increase the public support as well 
as the rate of recruitment. The atrocities and repression 
committed by adversary is directly linked with the increase 
in public support as well as rate of recruitment. The 
strategy is that some hDW manage the fulfilment of political 
objectives by using whatever means available to 
terrorists 
In the military parlance, terrorism like other 
unconventional warfare implicitly denies recognition of 
established rules and conventions of warfare. It refuses to 
distinguish between combatants and non combatants and 
recognises no humanitarian constrains. It includes acts of 
violence or compaigns of violence waged outside the accepted 
rules and procedure of international diplomacy and war. It 
is unconventional, unorthodox and fought by irregulars. It 
is characterised by the absence of pitched battles. It is 
looked upon as a warfare without territory, waoed without 
armies as we know them. It is like other unconventional 
warfare, way of conducting hostilities in certain 
circumstances by refusing to be committed to larqe scale 
engagement. Often it is a delaying strategy awaiting 
propitious political and militancy circumstances. All forms 
of violence whether guerrilla, insurgency terrorism have one 
basic common trait namely they are confrontationits, on 
small or large scale and seen as such by both sides. Each 
side recognises the other as its enemy and declares this 
openly. Although unconventional warfare it is believed that 
violence is practiced betweeen uniformed and recognisable 
combatants. but does not involve the civilians. The last 
war to confirm to these conventions was that of 1914. Since 
then. the new techniques of war have come up BO the 
13. See Iqbalur Rehman, National Security and the Problem of 
Unconventional Warfare. Kanishka Publishinp House, 
Delhi, 1992. 
adherence to those conventions is not possible. Moreover, 
the warfare has evolved itself towards the multiplicity of 
means and complexity of methods. It is no more considered 
as an independent military activity. It is fought these days 
simultaniously at various fronts : political. economic, 
military, diplomatic and psychological. So the belief that 
conventional warfare follows the international rules and 
principles seems true superficially. Terrorism in this 
perspective could be seem something not unconventional but-
conventional for. those who chose to carryout violence to 
their adversary through the means of terror. 
Terrorism although is an independent form of 
unconventional warfare, away from and outside the purview of 
guerrila warfare. revolutionary Warfare insurgency and 
conventional warfare, but terrorist means and methods are 
also freauently employed by guerrilla forces, insurgents and 
revolutionaries. The use of terror violence is interwoven 
with a wider repertoire of unconventional warfare. In 
central America for example terrorism is typically used 
inconjunction with rural guerrilla and economic and 
political warfare in all out bids to topple government . 
Terrorism is also used in conjunction with other forms of 
unconventional warfare due to the reason in some situations 
it became difficult to identitv that the conflict is the 
14. Paul Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart. Contemporary Research 
on Terrorism. Aberdeen University Press, 1989, p. 11. 
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case of pure terrorism or guerrilla warfare, insurgency or 
revolutionary warfare. However, there is a clear 
demarcating line between these forms of warfare at 
theoretical level but at practical level. Sometimes they 
seem interwoven together blurring the difference. All these 
forms of unconventional warfare are dependent to a great 
extent for their success and survival, upon the support of 
the populace. The degree of support of the population in 
revolutionary warfare is higher than in other forms of 
warfare, as revolutionary warfare aims at changing the whole 
system and the society. In case of terrorism the degree of 
population support is not as high as in cases of other forms 
of warfare. Terrorism may survive even of the majority is 
not supporting it. 
Insurgency and guerrilla warfare both adopt the same 
strategy and tactics to wage war against the conventional 
enemy but insurgents obtain an area or territory from where 
they operate their war activities where as guerrilla are not 
necessarily after the territory. However, guerrilla warfare 
in its eventual development tries to establish and control a 
territorial area. Guerrilla are illusive and the terrorists 
are even more, so both are more illusive then insurgents. 
The difference between insurgency and terrorism is that the 
later tries to evolve into farmer. The trouble in Kashmir 
is not simDly the case of terroism. It is rather the 
insrugency in incipient stage. Despite the demarcation 
which exits at theoritical level, the accompaying of 
12 
terrorims with other forms of warfare make this demarcation 
blurred thereby generating confusion about the proper 
classification of unconventional warfare. 
The causes of terroism are manifold. Various writers 
have written in details about the causes of warfare. To 
some of them war has its roots in the nature of human beings 
and to some other in the nature of mociety. According to 
one group human beings possess innate aggressive 
tendencies, the expression of which results in the form of 
warfare. The other group on the other hand holds that 
aggressiveness in human beings is not innate but that is 
learned. Human beings, according tD them by their nature 
are neither aggressive nor submissive, neither war like nor 
peaceful. they develop themsleves in either direction 
depending on what they learn by interacting with their 
environment and culture. they do not act and react 
mechanically according to their instinct, but according to 
the views and emotions they learn through experience. It 
could be therefore said that terrorism is not manifestation 
of human nature but making a specific response to specific 
15 
situations - Social, Political or Economic. 
Everv man possesses his own interest and coming 
together means the collision of interests. To satisfy their 
interersts, men organised themsleves into groups and then 
15. For Detils see. Collin's Encyclopaedia. Vol. 23, 
Macmillan, Education Company, New York, 19B7, pp. 230-
235. 
their croup interests are in conflict. When this happens 
they try to satisfy and resolves their conflicting interests 
through peaceful means and failing this what ensues is war. 
All this implies that war is a means for achievino and 
obtaining a desired objective and it does not occur without 
a reason/cause. 
However. the reason may not be einple or common. 
Reason/causes are diverse, often one cause overlaps another 
or several causes. It is therefore not possible to 
identify its real or universal cause. However, it has often 
occured in nations in which social grievances were 
manifested by a desire for political and social changes. It 
has no single specific cause. It has flourished in 
different countries at different times as a result of 
combination of different factors. 
Terrorism has been generally recognised as a special 
methods of struggle for political purposes. In this 
struggle there Are five major participants in the proccess 
of terrorta) practitioners of violence (terrorism) <b> The 
immediate victims (c) Wider target group or the society 
which the terrorists seek to intimidate <d) The neutral 
bystanders within the society experiencing the terrorism 
and <e) The public opinion, national or international 
including media. It also includes some of the basic 
characteristics : a) Violence, b) Political Purpose, c) 
Objective to instill fear, to terrorise d) Continuity of 
threat with unpredictability of how, when and where the 
terror. will be committed. Terrorism with these 
characteristics is a form of warfare for political purposes. 
It is an instrument to weaken the adversary to surrender to 
the demands of practitioners of terrorism. Terrorists bv 
using different tactics carry out violence to the adversary 
for political purposes. 
TACTICS AND METHODOLOGY OF TERRORISM : 
The variety of methods are adopted by terrorists. 
These include assassination, expropriation, kidnapping, 
destruction, hijacking, etc. The list is far from exhaustion. 
Rape assult, arson, etc. are very much the tools of 
terrorists. Since terrorists operate in small numbers, 
they do not go in far large targets. Operations are 
conducted in a spectacular fashion as possible by 
concentrated. coordinated and synchronized waves of 
simultaneous actions. Statistically, of the over 7000 
terrorist incidents between 1968 and 1983. 2504 entailed the 
use of explosives including bombing, 189 involved the use of 
hijacking of areoplanes or other means of transportation.421 
were kidnapping, 498 were assassinations, 168 involved 
barricade of hostages and 293 constituted other armed 
attacks. 
ASSASSINATION t 
Assassination in simple terms can be defined as 
murder by interested parties for the reward. It is carried 
15 
out bv surprise or secretly. The word has been derived from 
Arabic word "Hash Ashin". Hashish-caters. A military and 
religious sect in Syria in the 11th century which become 
natoriDus for its secret murder in obedience to the will of 
its chief, fortifield themselves for their adeventure bv 
tackling Hashish an intoxicating drug and drink made from 
Hemp. They always operated in complete secrecy, some times 
disguished as strangers and christians, and always used a 
dagger, never poison or a missile assassination has been 
justified or even urged, as a revolutionary means by a 
number of authority. It is the oldest method and has been 
the most frequently adopted by terrorists . 
Murder or killing dramatises the demdnds of 
terrorists. The list of important victims is for from 
exhaustive but the assassinations which made some impact on 
massess. Pleasant or unpleasant are very few in number. 
Although the assassination as a means was employed by the 
Punjabi terrorist to murdered to Prime Minister of India 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984, Rajive Gandhi was 
assassinated by the LTTE at Tamil Millitant organisation of 
Sri Lanka. This organisation is also responsible for many 
such acts committed in Sri Lanka. Assassination is most 
eficacious tactics of the terrorist. It is generally 
exmployed to eliminate those high in authority as their 
16. D.P. Sharma, Op.Cit.. PP 21-22, also see Eric Morris. 
Op.Cit.. pp. 74-75. 
elimination results in to the national crises providing 
boost to the terrorist cause and their moral*7. 
KIDNAPPING t 
The second most frequent method of terrorist 
operation has been kidnapping. It has made use of from 
times immemorial for political purposes and for exportion of 
ransom. It however, increased greatly in the late 1960s. 
The Tupamaros in Uruouary are considered the poineers in the 
technique of kidnapping of important members of the 
diplomatic corps and holdinq them hostage. The outstanding 
cases of abduction were the US Ambassador to Guatemala and 
Brazil. the West German Ambassador to Guatemala. President 
of Argentina (1970). the Swiss Ambassador to Brazil. the 
British Ambassador to Uruguay (1971) and the OPEC executive 
in Vienna (1975). 
After 1973 the rate of kidnapping decreased. The 
year 1974, however, saw the kidnapping of patricia Hearst in 
San Francisco and the attempted kidnapping of Princess Anne 
in London. The Syrmbionese Liberation Army (SLA).USA, 
Kidnapped patricia Hearst, the daugher of a rich businessman 
for ransom. They tried to obtain wide publicity bv 
demanding food far the poor instead of the usual 1 ransom. 
Kidnapping gained momentum again during 1976-78. In Italy 
kidnapping far ransom became one of the biggest businesses 
of the Republic of Italy18. 
17. Eric Morris. Op.Cit•. pp. 74-75. 
18. Ibid, pp. 22-23. 
4th February 1984. an Indian diplomat, R.H. Mahatre. 
was kidnapped near Briminggham (England) by KLA (Kashmir 
Liberation Army) terrorist and subsequently murdered. 
The kidnapping is not necessarily under taken for 
ransom but also some times to bargain the release of other 
captured terrorists. The daughter of the Home Minister of 
India, was kidnapped by the Kashmiri militants, few years 
back to seek the release of prisoner militants. Their 
demand was met an few militants were released. 
HOSTAGE BARRICADE s 
Traditionally in Kidnapping the hostage is taken to a 
hideout and kept during the ransom negotiation. The 
kidnappers communicate by note or telephone, at their own 
initiative, and they make break off communication at will. 
They can be talked to only durino phone calls, otherewise 
they may be reached indirectly, by radio broadcasts or press 
publication. In the hostage barricade situation. the 
kidnappers seize one or more hostages but make no attemDt to 
reach a hideout. In fact, they are also hostages thev 
usually barricade themselves in a building and immediately 
warn that armv attempt to kill or captured them will 
disastrous for the hostages. The terrorists, then include 
their own escape as a part of anv subsequently baroain. 
Hostage Barricade is a very during tactics of the terrorist 
because terrorist themselves make hostages bv taking 
hostages. What happens in these cases is what the area 
where the hostages are held in surrounded by military or the 
commando force. But in such situations the counter 
terrorist force of a country is efficient anouoh the result 
is the failure of the terrorist action. In the hostages 
taking incidents Generally the demands is the release the 
prisoner not the extortion or ransom. However, this tactics 
is more effective in publicizing the terrorists cause. 
HIJACKING : 
Hijacking is a another method of terrorist. 
Hijacking means basically the capturing the aeroplanes in 
the take of situations. This method pained currrency and 
credibility during the 1970'». when the militant 
organisation of Plestine Liberation Organisation carried out 
a number of hijackings. Later on with the improvements in 
the security arrangements at the airports reduced the 
hijacking incidents to almost negligible level. Terrorist 
to meet out the situation, so developed started hijacking 
trains, buses and other things hijacking incidents in India, 
although not many but have been carried out by the 
terrorist. Hijacking still is a method available to the 
terroris. Hijacking incident is an attention getting event 
which finds media coverage there by propogating the cause of 
terrorism . 
19. S.K. Ghosh, Aircraft Hijacking. Ashish Publishing House, 
New Delhi, 1985. pp. 1-2. 
EXPROPRIATION : 
Expropriation is another tod in the hands of 
terrorists. Bank robberies and robberies of trains and Vans 
carrying large sums of money have been carried out in 
Russia, India and many other countries from 1960, onwards. 
It is considered the easiest operation in which new entrants 
are tested. Huge amounts are collected from bank robberies 
mainly to finance the terrorist activities. 
Terrorists in Punjab also have resorted to these 
tactics. In the greatest bank robbery carried out so for in 
India, the terrorists looted 5.65 crores of ruppes from a 
Punjab National Bank Bracnh in the industrial town of 
Ludhiana on February 12, 1987. Six terrorists in Police 
uniform led by an "Inspector" entered the bank hall through 
the side gate around 9.10 A.M. They told the bank guards who 
accosted them that they had come tD check the security 
arrangement. They made enquiries about the strong room and 
alarm bells. Meanwhile, others (terrorists) took position in 
the main business hall. The terrorists, forced the head 
cashier to open the chest room and strong room. Terrorist 
did not stop any body entering the bank but no sooner did 
they enter than they were asked to sit in the corner of the 
hall with their heads down. The operation lasted for one 
hour and forty five minutes. Currency notes were collected 
in gunny bags and carried away in two waiting metador vans. 
Expropriation besides being an easy method available 
to the terrorist is also a means which provides finances for 
the sustenance of terrorist activity. Although the entire 
retirements of finances is not fetched throuoh 
expropriation but it is contributing factors for the funding 
of terrorist operations and cDmpaigns. 
BOMBS AND EXPLOSIVES : 
Bombs are amono the oldest weapons of the terrorists. 
Bombs may be cigar bombs, grenades, gasoline bombs, plastic 
explosives, wallet bombs, parcal or latter bombs, book 
bombs, transister bombs. R.D.X. or radio remote control 
activated bombs. They can be engeniously disquised as 
common everyday objects like hairs-spray cans. Sauces 
\Liauid Bomb), tennis balls (grenades) suitcases and various 
types of toys. A bombs may be posted in a letter or a 
parcel. It may be lift in a suitcase, it may be locked in 
the boot of a car or it may simplv be a boobv trap. 
Incendiary bombs, though less lethal are easier to place^-'. 
June 23, 1985. will go down as a black dav in Indian 
history far on this day a suspected powerful bomb explosion 
caused the Crash of Air India Jumbo Jet Kanishka off the 
Irish coast Killino all the 329 passengers and crew on 
board. August 2. 1984. a bomb blasted at Meenam Bakkam 
Airport Madras. Killing 29 persons, the blast occured as two 
20. Karl A. Seger, The Anti Terrorism Hand Book. Lancer 
International. New Delhi. 1990. pp. 43-44, also see, 
D.P. Sharma. Op.Clt.. pp. 27-28. 
items of baggage unclaimed after being checked in for the 
Colombo flight were seized by customs and were beino moved 
through the international arrival hall. In May 1985 a 
number of transistor bombs exploded in Delhi and adjoining 
areas killing as many as 69 innocent people"-*. Bomb blasts 
in Bombay, on March 12. 1993. the uncertain peace was 
shattered bv a series of deadly explosions of hipht 
intensity bombs in the very heart of the metropolis. It was 
a meticulously planned and ruthlessly carried out multi-
pronged terrorists strike which killed more than 300 
innocent persons and injured more than 1000 others. 
Terrorism had come to Bombay literally with a bano. Bombay 
is the very heart of India's commerce and trade and the 
targets seemed to have been carefully selected to effect 
commerce; targets being the Bombay Stock Exchange. Bank of 
Baroada, Air India Headauarters. Passport Office, etc. In 
all 12 places were selected over a 20 kms area. The bombs 
apparently placed in parked vehicles, some with times 
devices and others remotely controlled, burst with deadly 
intensity, within a Span of two hours"*""". 
Bombs and explosive frequently use to tactics of 
terrorists. This is also an easy and safe method available 
to the terrorists for carrying out the violence to the 
adversary. 
21. Karl A. Seger. The Anti Terrorism Hand Book. Dp.Ci t. pp. 
27-28. 
22. Ma.i. Gen. Rajendra Nath, "In the Eye of the Storm", 
Defence Today. Vol. 1. August 1993. p. 43. 
MASS KILLINGS : 
There is a difference between a mass murder and 
individual assassination. While individual killing is 
mostly selective. no such restrictions are attached to 
general killing which will always be at random. Masskillino 
of innocent people in Punjab, Jammu 8< Kashmir and North East 
of India. is common phenomenon. In harch 1984. the Naga 
insurgents massacred 300 people in Norhtern Burma for 
refusing to cooperate with the rebels belonging to the 
National Socialist council of Nagaland. In two different 
incidents terrorists killed 70 bus Passenger on 6th and 7th 
Julv 1987. in the Patiala district of Punjab and the Hissar 
district of Haryana. There is no end to the techmaues and 
tactics adopted bv terrorists. Some times lettters of 
threat have served the purpose. This tool has been wickedly 
and effectively handled bv militant in Punjab. Threatening 
letters have ben issued to judges. T.V. Cameraman. school 
teachers, politicians and government officials with good 
results. 
These are the few and the freauently employed methods 
and tactics of terrorism. Terrorism does not follow any 
particular course of method in stick sence. Infact this is 
warfare which possess flexibility and creativtv within 
itself. The Tactics are chosen dependina on the logistics 
and the prevailing situations. In other words the resources 
available to the terrorist farmulate their tactis J means to 
carrv out violence to the superior and the stronoer enemv 
with whom they are short of meetino in open combat. This 
warfare became the conciously chosen wav of fiohtino for 
those sufferine from disparity and ineaui 1 ibrium in 
comparison with the enemy aoainst whom the violence is to be 
carried out. 
Chapter - 2 
The Rise And Growth Of 
Militancy And Terrorism in 
I n d i a *. (Pre-Independence Period) 
It has been a misconceDtion Generally believed that 
India has had an unbroken traditions of non-violence from 
where a message of non-violence has been delivered for the 
mankind. Not only the traditions of Buddha. Ashoka and 
Gandhiji cited that but a legend had been established that 
India achieved independence by. and only through non-violence 
methods. When the era of mass politics was introduced in 
India early this century liberals in politics were oicturised 
that stooges and lacking incourages in the first two decades 
of the present century. Indian national, because of more 
militant and aggressive a number of extremist had no 
philosophical objectives to militancv and use of violence but 
they became concious by the fact that the consiguences to the 
use of violence would be forwards. 
Even before the movement of 1857, there were instances 
of armed revolt in several parts of the country. In 1764. 
there was a revolt in the Bengal army during the period when 
the British were fighting against Neooleon. there was a 
mutiny of Sepoys in 1795. Indian soldiers in the Madras army 
in Veliore revolted in 1806. The Wahabi movement was started 
in the 18th Century under the leadership of Muhammad Abdul 
Wahab. In India, the initiative for wahabism was taken bv 
Syed Ahmad Wahabi of Bareilly. The Wahabis preached revolt 
against the British authority and once thev engaged in a 
small battle near Ambala against the British. Other Wahabi 
leaders were Shriyatulla and his son Dudhu'Mian. Titu Mian 
and Sherivatulla organised revolts in Nadia, Faridour and the 
twenty four Parganas. The movement of 1B57. which was called 
a sepov mutiny and which is now considered as the first war 
of Indian independence, was the most dramatic vindication of 
armed revolt. Although its leadership was constituted bv 
former prince* and feudal agencies and although eoldiers 
fought in it, nevertheless, this movement evoked tremendous 
patriotic feelings in the population of North India1. 
In 1B94. Damodar Chafekar and his brother Balkrishna 
Chafekar formed an association named society for the 
protection of Hindu religion. They were inspired by the 
exaple of Shivaji and they were shot to death, on June 22. 
1B97. Rand, the Poona Plague commissioner. The murder of 
Rand and Ayerst is regarded as the first example of terrorist 
violence in Indian politics, although it is the view of some 
historians that the activities of Vasudeva Balvant Phadke. in 
1876. should be regarded as the first instance of political 
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violence . 
Shvam.ii Krishnavarma and establishment of Indian House 
at London : Shyamaji Krishnavarma a native of Kathiawar in 
western India. had studied at Cambridge University and 
qualified for the Bar. After his return to India, he served 
1. V.P. Varma, Modern Indian Political Theory. Lakshmi 
Narain. Agarwal Educational Publishers, Agra, 1985, 
p. 32B. 
2. Ibid. 
in several Indian states but felt thoroughly disgusted witn 
the overbearing attitude of political residents. He decided 
to work for India's Liberation from British oppression and 
chose London as the centre of his activities. In 1905 
Krishnaverma set up the India Home Rule Society popularly 
known as the India Houses he also published a monthly 
Journal. The Indian Sociologist', The name 'Sociologist' 
symbolises the great influence of Herbert Spencer on Shvamji. 
This paper bore this inscription on its front page — "An 
organisation of freedom of political and social reform". He 
also instituted six fellowships of Rs. 1.000 each for 
aualified Indians visiting foreign countries. Very soon the 
India House became a centre of Indian activities in London. 
A group of Indian revolutionaries! including V.D. Savarkar, 
Hardaval and Madan Lai Dhingra became members of the India 
House0. 
V.D. Savarkar. a voung graduate from Fergusson College 
Poona availed of Krishnavarma's fellowship offer and left for 
London in June 1906. Earlier at Nasik. Savarkar had setup an 
association called 'Mitra Mela' which in 1904 had been 
merged into the Secret Society called Abhinav Bharat' after 
Mazsini's young Itly'. The band of young enthusiasts made 
India House a centre for pro-India and anti-British 
propaganda. In May 1900 the India House celebrated the 
3. R.K. Majumdar and A.N. Srivastava, History of Modern 
India,S.B.D.Publishers & Distributers, New Delhi. 1991. 
p.235. 
golden jubilee of the Indian revolt of 1857 and'V.D. Savarkar 
described it as a war of independence. Savarkar'= views were 
published the following year in his book entitled. The 
Indian war of independence', 1B57. Another Pamphelet 
entitled "Grave Warning" was widely distributed in London and 
copies sent to India . 
Where as B.6. Tilak had believed that it was 
impossible and impracticable for us to follow the militant 
Irish methods revolutionaries like Savarkar did not share 
this believe. They are asserted that it was only bv waging a 
violent revolutionaries was apainst the British that India 
could pain independence- Severely asserted that arms revolt 
terrorism disobi'dience to law. sadition and all such method 
an inavailable and desirable for the over through of the 
British. 
The partition of Bengal in 1905. accentuated the 
revolutionary impulses of many young Indians. They took to 
the bomb and the pistol and individual acts of terrorism. 
Thev lost all faith in constitutional agitation, or even in 
passive resistance. The British, thev felt, must be over 
thrown by force. The Jugantar expressed their credo in an 
editorial published on 22 April 1906 after the Barisai 
conference was broken up bv the police, "the remedy lie with 
4. B.L. Grover, A New Look on Modern Indian History. S. 
Chand & Co.. New Delhi, 1986, p. 406. 
the DEDDIE themselves. The 30 crores of people inhabiting 
India must raise their 60 crores of hands to stop this curse 
of oppression. Force must be stopped by force". 
But these youno terrorists, however, did not try to 
plan or organise a revolutuion based on violence and 
involving the whole country with the masses participating. 
They preferred to follow in the toolsteps of the Irish 
terrorist and the Russian Nihilists and assassinate 
individual officials, who either because of their anti Indian 
attitude or because of their repressive actions, had become 
unpopular. The India was to strike terror in the hearts of 
the rulers and thus to arose the people politically and 
ultimatelv to drive the British out of India. By its very 
nature the planning and organisation, the recruitment and 
training had to be secret underground activities. Manv 
secret societies were setup, especially in Bengal and 
Maharashtra. Some of them functioned under the guise of 
phvsical culture clubs or associations"'. 
In Bengal old Anusilan and Yugantar Samities and a new 
revolutionary organisation setup in the District of 
Chittagong under the leadership of Survasen, signalised the 
resumption of revolutionary activities. Many revolutionary 
organizations erupted in almost all important towns of 
Northern India. Between 1922-24 Yugantar was responsible for 
5. Bipan Chandra, Freedom Struggle. National Book Trust. 
India, New Delhi, 1972, pp. 95-96. 
major terrorist activity in Bengal. This was followed in 
march by the discovery of a bomb factory in Calcutta6. 
Mitramela started by the Savarkar brothers in 
Maharashtra, became the auite well known. When V.D. Savarkar 
went abroad his elder brother Ganesh started the Abhinava 
Bharat Society, which soon had many branches all over western 
India . 
The deportation Df Ajit Singh (uncle of Bhagat Singh) 
and Lala Lajpat Rai to liandalay. in 1907, had prepared the 
back ground of the terrorist movement. It gave, perhaps, 
some indirect force to the cult of the bomb. Bhai Parmananda 
also had a copy of the bomb Manual which was found with the 
Alipur conspiracy case convicts. Lala Hardayal was another 
person who provided inspiration to the terrorists. Dinanath, 
J.N. Chatterjee and Master Amirchand, a teacher of Delhi, 
were his disciples. Ras Bihari Bose carried forward the work 
of Lala Hardayal. 
Madame Cama addressed the stuttoart international 
socialist conference in Auosut, 1907. On August 18. she 
unfurted the first tricolour flag of Indian liberation. 
Hemachandra Das. a Bengali revolutionary. in Paris. had 
designed this flag. The top strip of this flag was green 
with designs of Lotus flowers set in. the middile strip was 
6. Bipan Chandra, India Struoole for Independence. Penguin 
Books India. New Delhi, 19B9, p. 144 see B.L. Grover. 
Qp.Cit., p. 409. 
7. B.L.Grover. Qp.Cit.. p. 406. 
orange with the mantra (Slogan) Bande Mataram and the bottom 
strip was deep red with the sun at the one end the crescent 
moon at the other. There was no star over the moon. 
THE MUZAFFARPUR MURDERS AND THE ALIPORE CONSPIRACY CASE i 
On 30 April 1908 an attempt was made to murder Mr. 
Kingford, the Judge of Muzaffarpur (now in Bihar) who 
earlier as chief Presidency Magistrate had awarded serve 
punishments to some young men for trivial offences. Prafulla 
Chaki and Khudiram Bose were charged with the duty of bomb 
throwing. The Bomb was by mistake thrown on the carriage of 
Mr. Kennedy, killing two ladies. Proofulla Choki and Bose 
were arrested. Chaki shot himself dead while Bose was tried 
and hanged. 
The govrernment searches for illicit arms at Maniktala 
gardens and elsewhere at Calcutta lad to the arrest of 34 
persons including the two GhDse brothers. Arobindo and 
Barindra who were tried in the Alipore conspiracy case during 
the trial Narendra Gosain, who had turned approver, was shot-
dead in Jail. In February 1909 the Public Prosecutor was 
shot dead in Calcutta and on 24 February 1910, a Deputy 
Superintendent of Police met the same fate while leaving the 
Calcutta High Court . 
6. G.V. Ketkar, "Madame Cama's Tricolour", Organiser. Vol. 
XXI. No. 1, August 15, 1967. p. 23. 
9. B.L. Grover, Op. C i t. . P. 407. see R.K. Ma.iumdar Qp.Cit. . 
p. 233. 
In Maharashtra Nasik. Bombay and Poona became centres 
of bomb manufacture. An attempt was made on the viceroy s 
life. On 21 December 1909 Mr. Jackson. District Maoistrate 
of Nasik. was shot at a farewell party. Even before this, in 
1909 Madan Lai Dhingra killed Curzon Wyllie, an official of 
the India office in London as a protest against the inhuman 
transportations and hanging of young Indians. He was 
executed "The only lesson", he wrote before death. "required 
in India is to learn how to die and the only way to teach it 
is by dying alone". 
In Madras province the people were excited by the 
eloQuent speeches of Bipin Chandra Pal. Chidambaram Pillai 
openly spoke of absolute independence. His arrest led to a 
serious riot in Tuticorin and Tinnevelly in which the police 
opened fire on a defiant crowd. Ashe, who had ordered the 
firing at Tinnevelly. was assassinated bv Vanchi Aiyar of 
'the Bharatha Matha Association' unable to escape. Vanchi 
Aiyar shot himself (". 
In Rajasthan Arjun Lai Seth. Bharat Kesari Singh and 
Gopal Singh tried to organise the revolutionaries. even 
though their activities were not very widespread. Similarly 
in Banaras Shachinder Sanayal's revolutionary organisation 
continued to inspire the people tD keen the spirit of the 
revolution alive . 
10. Bipan Chandra, Freedom Struoqle. Op.Cit.. p. 77. 
11. R.K. Majumdar, Op.Cit.. p. 235. 
PUNJAB : In Punjab the revolutionary movement was led by 
Sardar Ajit Singh, the uncle of great Martyr Sardar Bhapat 
Singh. He along with his friends organised a society known 
as " An jaman-i-liuhiban-i-Watan ', also known as Bharat Mata. 
The society strongly condemned the repressive policy of the 
government and encouraged the peasants not to pay revenue to 
the government. The situation became so tense that the Lt. 
Governor of Punjab called on the higher authorities to take 
immediate drastic steps to prevent repetition of the events 
of 1857. Ajit Singh and other revolutionary leaders were 
arrested and sentenced to five years imorisonement. However, 
soon after their release, Ajit Singh and Amba Prasad left 
India to continue revolutionary activities from Europe. In 
their absence Lala Pindi Das, Lai Chand etc. continued to 
guide the revolutionary in Punjab . 
Rashbehari Bose. then a clerk at Dehradun, became link 
between Bengal and Punjab. On 23 December 1912. Lord Harding 
was taken in a procession on the back of an elephant in 
Delhi. When the people were showering flowers and coconuts on 
the procession in Chandni Chowk. a bomb exploided which 
injured the Viceroy and killed his A.D.C. The procession was 
turned into a funeral. The Bomb was thrown bv Rashbehari 
Bose. There was a lot of confusion and Rashbehari managed to 
escape. A reward of Rs. 7.500 was amounted for the arrest of 
12. K.S. Sardesi, R. Venkataramanayya. Dr. S. Sen and Dr. 
G.S. Mansukhani, Unioue Quintessence of Modern India. 
Unigue Publications. New Delhi. 1993. p. 273. 
Rashbehan Bose. He was chased from Dlace to place but every 
time he managed to escape. He went away to Japan under a 
fictitious name. He played an important role in organising 
the Indian National Army (INA) in Japan. He died in 1945101. 
THE GHADAR MOVEMENT : 
Hardayal, an intellectual giant and a fire brand 
revolutionary from the Punjab was the moving spirit behind 
the organization of the Ghadar Party, on 1 November 1913 at 
San Fransisco in the USA. He was actively assisted by Ram 
Chandra and Barkatulla. The party also published a weekly 
paper the Ghadar (Rebellion) in commemoration of the Mutiny 
of 1857. The Ghadar in its premier issue asked the questions 
: What is our name ? Mutiny. What is our work ? Mutiny. 
Where will Mutiny break out ? In India. The Ghadar party 
highlighted the point that Indians were not respected in the 
world abroad because they were not free. Consequent upon 
complains made by the British representative, the U.S. 
authorities launched preceedings against Hardayal, compelling 
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him to leave the United States . 
With the outbreak Df World War I Hardayal and other 
Indians abroad moved to Germany and setup the Indian 
independence committee at Barlin. The committee planned to 
mobilise Indians settlers abroad to make all efforts-send 
13. Ibid. 
14. Summit Sarkar. Modern India. S.G. Wasani for Macmillian 
India Limited. Madras, 19B3, pp. 145-146. 
voluneteers to India, to incite rebellion amono the troops, to 
send explosives to Indian revolutionaries and even organise 
i s 
an invasion of British India to Liberate the country . 
The Komagata liaru case created an explosive situation 
in Punjab. One Baba Gurdit Singh chartered a Japanese ship 
Komagata Maru for Vancouver and sought to carry 351 Sikhs and 
21 Punjabi Muslims to that town. The Canadian authorities 
refused permission to the ship to land and the ship returned 
to Budge Budge. Calcutta on 27 September 1914. The inmates of 
the ship and many Indian believed that the British 
government had inspired the Canadian authorities. The 
government of India ordered all the passengers to be carried 
direct by train to the Punjab. The already explosive 
situation in the Punjab worsened with a band of fresh 
malcontents. Large scale political dacoities were committed 
in the Jallundur Amritsar, Ludhiana districts of Punjab. The 
Lahore conspirancv trials revealed that Punjab had come 
within a race of widespread bloodshed'. 
The virtual failure of the non-cooperation movement 
and the gloom that descended on the nationalist scene again 
created conditions calling for bold and terrorist 
revolutionary activities. The old Anusilan and Yugantar 
Samities reappeared in Bengal and revolutionary organisations 
erupted in almost all important towns of Northern India. A 
15. Ibid. 
new development was, however, the feeling that better results 
could be achieved only through an all India organization and 
better coordination. Hence a meeting of revolutionaries from 
all parts of India was called at Kanpur in October 1924. The 
Kanpur meeting was attended by old timers like Sachindranath 
Sanyal, Jogesh chandra Chatterjee and Ramorasad Bismil and 
youngsters like Bhagat Singh, Shiv Verma, Sukhdev, Bhagwati 
Charan Vohra and Chandrashekhar Azad. The deliberations 
resulted in the setting up of the Hindustan Republican 
Association (HRA), subseguently (September 1928) reorganised 
as the Hindustan Socialist Republican Association or Army 
(H.S.R.A.) with provincial units in Bengal, Bihar, U.P. 
Delhi, the Punjab and even Madras. Whose basic principle 
would be adult franchiseito. 
Before armed struggle could be waged, propaganda had 
to be organised on large scale, men had to be recruited and 
trained and arms had to be procured- All these required 
money. The most important 'action' of the HRA was the Kakori 
Robbery. On 9, August 1925, ten men held up the 8-Down train 
at Kakori, an obscure village near Lucknow, and looted its 
official railway cash. The government reaction was Quick and 
hard. It arrested a large number of young men and tried them 
in the Kakori conspirancy case. Ashfagulla Khan, Ramprasad 
Bismil, Roshan Singh and Rajednra Lahiri were hanged. four 
16. B.L. Brover, Op.Cit. p. 409. 
others were sent to the Andamons for life and seventeen 
others were sentenced to long terms of imDrisonment 
chandrashekhar Azad remained at large . 
The Kakori case was a major setback to the 
revolutionaries of northern India, but it was not a fatal 
blow. Younger men such as BeJOY Kumar Sinha, Shiv Varma and 
Jaidev Kapur in U.P., Bhapat Singh, Bhagwati Charan Vohra and 
Sukhdev in Punjab set out to reorganise the HRA under the 
leadership of Chandrashekher Azad. Finally, nearlv all the 
major young revolutionaries of nothern India met at FerDZShah 
Kotla ground at Delhi on 9 and 10 September 1928. created a 
new collective leadership, adopted socialism as their 
official goal and changed the name of the party to the 
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Hindustan socialist Republican Association <Army) (HSRA) . 
On October 20, 1928 the Simon Commission visited 
Lahore. The Hindustan socialist Republican Party took out a 
huge procession against the Simon Commission under the 
leadership of Lala Lajpat Rai. I.P. Saunders gave blows on 
the head and chest of Lajpat Rai and theory caused grievous 
injuries on his person. As a result of those injuries, 
Lajpat Rai died on 17 November, 1928. The death of this 
great Punjabi leader, popularly known as Sher-»—Panjab, was 
seen by the romantic youthful leadership of the HSRA as a 
direct challenge. In order to have revenge, Saunders was 
17. Bipan Chandra. 
Op. Ci t. . p. 24B. 
IB. Ibid. 
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murder. Bhagat Singh and Raj Guru managed to escape •. On & 
April 1929 two bombs were thrown from the visitor's qallery 
on the central Assembly Hall in New Delhi by Bhagat Singh and 
B.K. Dutt. They could have run away but surrendered to the 
Police. Their trial started on 7 May 1929 and on 12 June. 
1929, the sessions judge sentence them to transportation for 
life. 
In the Saunders murder case, the trial started at 
Lahore. Bhagat Singh was taken from Delhi to Lahore to stand 
his trial for murder along with Sukhdeve. Raj Guru and ten of 
other revolutionaries. Their fearless and defiant attitude 
in the courts-every day they entered the court room shouting 
slogans 'Inquilab-Zindabad', Down Down with imperialism, long 
live the proletariat and singing songs such as a 'Sarfaroshi 
Ki Tamanna ab Hamare di mei hai ' <our heart is filled with 
the desire for martyrdom) and Mera rang de basanti chola \dve 
my clothes in saffron clour) (the colour of courage ana 
sacrifice) was reported in newspapers. They won the sympathy 
of the people all over the country, includino those who had 
complete faith in non violence. The tribunal which tried 
Bhagat Singh and his companions, gave its decision on 7 
October, 1930 and Bhagat Singh. Rajguru and Sukhdev were 
sentenced to death. Thev were hanged on 23 March 1931 at 
Lahore. When the people heard their hanging many persons. 
all over the country, wept and refused to eat food. attend 
19. Jag Mohan Singh and Chamanlal, Bhaoat Sinoh Our Unke 
Sathivon Ke Dastavez <The documents of Bhapat Sinoh and 
his comrades) New Delhi, 1986, in Hindi, p. 266. 
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school, or carry on their daily work . 
In different parts of the country Chandrashekher Azad. 
Bhagwati Charan, Yashpal continued their terrorist 
activities. In December 1929 they made a bid to blast the 
train of the viceroy near New Delhi. However. Lord Curzon 
the Viceroy narrowly escaped. These revolutionaries also 
prepared a plan to secure help from Russia for overthrowing 
the British government. However, before the Plan could be 
implemented Chandrashekher Azad killed himself to escape 
arrest by the British police, when he was encircled in Alfred 
Park at Allahabad. Yashpal the other revolutionary leader 
continued to lead the movement for same time before he was 
arrested by the British and sentenced to fourteen years 
rigorous imprisonment"^ . However, with the formation of the 
conpress Ministeries in march 1938 he was set free. Even the 
information of the I.N.A. by Subhash Chandra Bose during the 
Second World World War was a revolutionary activity. 
INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY s (INA) x 
The Quite India Movement <CIM) was a struggle fought 
against the British in India. But equally important is the 
role of the Indian National Army which waged battles against 
the British from foreign soil. 
20. Bipan Chandra. India's Struogle For Independence. 
Qp.Cit.. pp. 249-50 see BL Grover, Qp.Cjt.. pp. 410-411. 
21. R.K. Majumdar, Op.Cit.. p. 238. 
There were many Indian revolutionaries working abroad 
for the country's cause. Among these was Rashbehari Bose. 
living as a fugitive from the British since 1915 in Japan. 
He seized the opportunity offered by the war to mobilise 
Indians for an armed struggle agains the British. There were 
a number of Indian soldiers fighting on behalf of the 
British. The Japanese after defeating the British in South 
East Asia, took a number of Indian soldiers as prisoners of 
war. Major Fujiwara a Japanese army officer persuaded 
captain Mohan Singh — a POW (Prisoner of War) — to work in 
collaboration with the Japanese for India's freedom. In 
March 1942 a conference of Indians was held in Tokyo. and 
they formed the Indian Independence League. This was followed 
by a conference in Bangkok (June 1942) where Rashbihari Bose 
was elected president of the league and a decision was taken 
to raise the Indian National Army. Captain Mohan Singh was 
appointed the commander of the INA which now had about 40.000 
Indian soldiers. This conference invited Subhaschandra Bose 
to lead the movement. Subhas Chandra Bose had escaped from 
India in 1941 to Berlin. In June. 1943 he came to Tokyo and 
then .-joined the INA at Singapore in July, Rashbihari Bose 
handed over the leadership to Subhas Bose and an Azad Hind 
Sarkar was formed. In November 1943 the Japanese announced 
their decision to hand over the administration of Andamans 
and Nicobar Islands tD the INA. Thus started the herotic 
struggle of the INA for India's Independence*- . 
22. Sumit Sarkar, Modern India. S.G. Wasani for Macnillian 
India Limited. Madras. 1983, p. 410. 
The INA in a few months time had three fighting 
brigades named after Gandhi, Asad and Nehru. Soon other 
brigades were raised, namely the Subhas brigade and the Ram 
Jhansi brigade. The overseas Indians contributed heavily in 
terms of money and material for the army. The slogans of the 
INA were 'Jai Hind' and 'Delhi Chalo'. The most famous was 
Subhas s declaration is that 'Turn Mujhe Khoon Do Mai Tumhe 
Azadi Dunga' <You give me blood I will give you freedom). 
Fighting side by side with the Japanese armed forces the INA 
crossed the Indian frontier on 18th march. 1944. The 
Tricolour was hoisted on Indian soil. However the INA failed 
to capture imphal due to two reasons : i) The Japanese 
failed to supply the necessary material and air cover to the 
INA. ii) The Monsoon prevented their advance. 
In the meantime the British were able to regroup their 
froces and made counter attacks. The INA fought heroically 
with tremendous loss of manpower, but the course of war was 
changing. With the collapse of Germany and set backs to the 
Japanese armies, the INA too could not stand on its own. 
Subhas Chandra Bose disappeared. Some believed he died in an 
air crash, while others refused to believe this. 
The INA had failed to achieve its goal but it made a 
significant impact on the freedom struggle : i) It became 
clear to the British that they could no longer depend on the 
loyalty of Indian Soldiers and treat them as meceneries. ii) 
The struggles of the INA demonstrated that those who waged an 
armed struggle agianst the British were not at all affected 
by communal devision. There were Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs 
in the INA who had fought as Indians, iii) The actions of the 
Rani Jhansi Brigadier exclusively women force- demonstrated 
the capabilities of Indian women waging armed struggle 
against the British. iv) The INA had also demonstrated 
enthusiasm and concern of overseas Indians for the freedom of 
their motherland. 
In dealing with the role of Subhaschandra Bose during 
this period. We have to take note of the fact that what he 
did was not due to his support to Fascist Germany or 
expansionst Japan, but for India's freedom. He was 
determined to maintain the independent existence of INA from 
the Japanese and while in Berlin he had problems with the 
Germans regarding the use of Indians legion against USSR. 
The British Government Court martialed the INA officers and 
soldiers and put them on trial for conspiriing aoainst the 
king . 
It is thus clear that non-violence was accepted as a 
matter of convenience rather than as a matter of principle. 
Mrs. Annie Besant had observed that "the dav of victory for 
India (that is when India attained self government and 
freedom) would be the biggest day of defeat of Gandhi because 
the spirit of lawlessnes, resulting in loss of respect for 
23. Ibid, p. 411. 
law. which he was includihno through civil disobedience would 
react against the Indian Government and people would disobey 
authority on the lines tauaht to them by Gandhi". 
24. Kanji, Dwarkadas, Gandhiji, Throuoh my Diary leaves ; 
1915-194B. Published by Kanji Dwarkadas, May 1950. 
pp. 21-22. 
Chapter - 3 
Terrorism in Post-
Independence India 
A) Terrorism in Punjab 
B) Militancy and Terrorism in Jammu 
& Kashmir 
C) Terrorism in North East Region 
TERRORISM IN POST INDEPENDENCE INDIA 
Since independence Indian History is witness to 
various kinds of disturbance ranging from autonomous to 
separatist movements, some of which are still continuing. 
North East region is the area which has never been peaceful 
since independence. In these movements, violence was used 
as a political technique to achieve the purpose for which 
the violence was justified or carried out. Here it is 
necessary to analyse few of the violent movements, which the 
independent India has faced so far. Before analyzing the 
major movements like Punjabi Separatist Movement, North 
Eastern Disturbances and Kashmir Problem, it is pertinent 
here to look at other movements also to understand the 
dynamics of the movements in which terrorism was chosen as a 
way of fighting. 
The Telengana Peasant Armed Struggle <1946-51) was 
the first independence trend in the Indian Communist 
Movement. This movement, organised and led by the 
communists of the former Hyderabad state, was conducted 
mostly in defiance of the Indian communist leadership and 
the International Communist Movement Initially, this 
movement was organised around simple agrarian demands but 
escalated into violent guerrilla action against the 
repressive measures of the land lords and Nizam s 
1. Mohan Ram, "The Road from Naxalbari" in Times Weekly, 
August, 1973, D. 13. 
government. After Hyderabad's accession to. the Indian Union 
the peasant guerrillas continued to fight the Indian police 
and army"-. 
In 1948, the Communist Party of India adopted the 
theory of one stage revolution through the general strike 
insurrection methods. But the Andhra Communist, on Mao 
lines, defended their strategy for a two stage revolution 
through a protracted armed struggle of the peasantry based 
on an agrarian programmes0'. 
By this time dealing with cold war had replaced 
class struggle in the Soviet Union's foreign policy 
priorities. The CPI therefore, opted for peaceful 
constitutionalism formally abandoning the armed struggle. 
Thus, the Telangana struggle had to withdraw under pressure 
from the CPI and the International Communist Movement. 
The Russians had advised the CPI to follow the 
Chinese way to achieve independence in India . The CPI and 
other communist parties, who were willing to adopt the 
Chinese pattern of revolution, were given some guidelines by 
Liu Shao Chi, the then Vice-Chairman of China. Similarly 
he observed that "the trade union conference of Asian and 
Australian countries held in Peking on Nov., 16, 1949. It 
is necessary to setup when ever and wherever possible a 
2. Mohan Ram, "Telengana Peasant Armed Struggle", in 
Economic and Political Weekly, January 9, 1973. 
3. Mohan Ram, Times Weekly. August, 13, 1973, p. 13. 
People's Liberation Army led to the Communist Party, an army 
which is powerful and skillful in fighting enemies, as well 
as strong points for the operation of these armies and also 
to coordinate the mass struggle in the enemy controlled 
areas with the armed struggle. Moreover, armed struggle is 
the main forms of struggle in the national liberation 
struggle in many colonies. In waging armed struggle in the 
country outside, it should be combined with the legal and 
illegal struggle of the masses in the towns and districts 
controlled by the enemy". 
The communist from Andhra, Kerala and West Bengal 
rejected these formulations as "revisionist". They 
contended that, as Parliamentary democracy was not an 
effective weapon for socialist revolution, an armed struggle 
was inevitable. In July 1964, the latter faction met at 
Tenali and formed the rival Communist Party of India 
(Marxist), dedicated to the revolutionary goal and tactics. 
The first disturbance occurred in Naxal Bari on march 2, 
1967. the date on which the United Front Government, of 
which the CPI <M> was the dominant partner took office in 
West Bengal, owning allegiance to the constitution. Since 
the CPI<M> was more conscious of the constitutional 
obligations of the ministry dominated by it to maintain law 
and order in the state, the government went a head to 
5. Ibid, p. 46. 
suppress the revolt. This eroded the credibility of the 
CPI<M) as a revolutionary party. The lesson for the CPI<M)_ 
following and revolutionaries outside it was very clear to 
built a Moaist party, by splitting the CPI<M) if need be. 
Thus, the All India Co-Grdination Committee of Communist 
Revolutionaries (AICCCR) went a head to convert itself into 
the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) on April 22, 
1969. This party was to be based on the principles that; 
"<i) one of armed revolution, rejecting the parliamentary 
path; (ii) rural based, to rouse the peasantry to wage 
guerrilla warfare, unfold agrarian revolution, build rural-
base areas,use the countryside to m-circle cities, and 
finally to capture the cities; (iii) secret and underground, 
keeping its main cadre underground, and (iv) of a new style, 
integrating theory with practice". 
THE NAXALITE MOVEMENT : 
The term "Naxalite" has its origin in the small-
scale peasant revolt in a 256 square miles of rugged area 
in Naxalbari, Kharibari, Phansideoa in Silliguri sub 
division of Darjeeling district in West Bengal, in 1967. 
This revolt began with the call of the Kisan Sabha' of the 
Silliguri sub-division in March 1967 to (i) establish the 
authority of peasant committees in all matters of the 
village. (ii) get organised and be armed to crush the 
resistance of Jotedars and rural reactionary's and (iii) 
Smash the Jotedar monopoly of land ownership and 
redistribute the land through peasant committee6. 
As a -first steto in the implementation of the 
programme, armed groups of peasants were farmed in the 
villages. This task was to destroy the political, economic 
and social structure of the village through an agrarian 
programme to redistribute all the land that was not owned 
and tilled by peasants: to destroy all legal deeds and 
documents, with the land lords, scraping of all unequal 
agreements and mortgage deeds with land lords and money 
lenders and the confiscation of hoarded grain and work 
cattle and form implements belonging to land lords: the 
public trial and execution of all the land lords known to be 
oppressors and opponents of the peasant struggle . 
"The Naxalie Revolt", as they came to be known, 
brought to notice the potential of an agrarian revolution of 
India. They exploited the myth that the Indian peasant was 
not capable of violence. The first politically led peasant-
armed revolt took place, as mentioned earlier, in Telangana. 
For the first time after the 1946-51 Telangana revolt, and 
before the Naxalbari incident, communists again mobilized 
the peasants for a protracted armed struggle in Srikakulam, 
in Andhra. 
The next phase in the Naxalite movement was marked by 
6. Akhtar Majeed, "Political Violence of Among and 
Against the Communist in India", Indian Journals 
Politics, Vol. XI, No. 2. May - August, 1977, pp. 149-
150. 
7. Ibid, p. 150. 
the retreat from the rural sense to the urban areas. 
Calcutta and the neighbouring towns were made main centre of 
operation. In the beginning, the activities were confined 
to raiding educational institutions, disfiguring the status 
of national leaders and organising boycotts of examinations, 
but the personnel of the CPI<M), policemen and small 
businessmen. These actions brought immense publicity 
through the press and radio, which was not obtained by the 
rural revolt. But this shift in the area of operation also 
resulted in furthering ideological differences within the 
party, and more severe and determined action by the 
Q 
government against the Naxalities . 
These movements however could not succeed due to 
various reasons. Rather they were suppressed by the 
government. But still some part of the country specially 
Telengana area of state of Hyderabad is conflict prone. 
Peoples War Group is waging a war in the region. Although 
this war is not for independence separation but violence 
with the element of terror is being used to carry out 
violence. 
A - TERRORISM IN PUNJAB : 
Punjab had witnessed a spurt of terrorist activities 
during the 1980 s. Terrorist, entered a dangerous phase in 
1984-85. Earlier, during 1982-83 scores of innocent people, 
8. Ibid, pp. 150-151. 
mostly, Hindus were killed. In later phase Hindus as well 
as Sikhs including women and children were killed, with the 
use of the latest sophisticated weapons. 
Places of worship were burned by the militants, into 
arsenals. The accelerated lawlessness ultimately led to 
military action "Operation Blue Star" which became a sore 
point with the Sikhs. The assassination of Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi was a manifestation of militants anger against what 
they described as "Oppressive Policies of the Union 
Government". 
The Punjab problem is not a current one although it 
was started before partition, when Kartar Singh, the then 
General Secretary of the Akali Dal demanded in 1946, a "Sikh 
Home Land" for Sikh in Punjab. 
After Partition again demand arose for special 
privilege of Sikhs, because the terror and suffering brought 
on the Sikhs by partition made the Khalsa more insecure and 
so more favourably disposed to a separate state. Those who 
suffered much, the West Punjabi Sikhs were more inclined for 
separate homeland'. 
The migration of Sikhs tD East Punjab and the Muslims 
to the West Punjab made the Sikhs a much larger percentage 
of the total East Punjabi population, one third. Most Sikhs 
9. Bharat Bhushan, "The Origins of the Rebellion in the 
Punjab", Capital and Class, No. 24, Winter, 1985. 
London, Conference of Socialists Economists, p. 6. 
inhabited a defineable contiguous area an the East Punjab. 
When Harvana was formed in 1966 the Sikhs constituted 55"/. of 
the population, and 62/. of the Punjabi population. Then the 
leaders of the Sikh argued for a separate state on majority 
status. Since then several demands came out and made the 
situation more and more complex, that resulted in 
deteriorating the situation. 
The violent crises m Punjab actually started after 
coming in to the power of Congress(I) in 1980. The 
terrorists started bv murdering Nirankans, Sikhs and 
Hindus, opposed to their demands. The shocking murder of 
Lala Jagat Narain took place on September 9, 1981, periodic 
murder kept up a climate of violence and terror. A large 
number of these murders remained untraced. 
The murder of Jagat Narain was the beginning of the 
wave of terrorism that inflamed Punjab, and the failure o1 
Afctlis to condemn it was a typical attitude, they more or 
less, adopted over the killing of innocents subsequently. 
No Akali leader was at the funeral of Jagat Narain.Local 
Hindu reaction was hostile, some of the processionists threw 
stones at Sikhs passing by, raised anti-Sikhs slogans and 
tried to set fire to the building of Ajit a pro-Akali 
Punjabi paper . 
This was the time when the government could have 
10. Abida Samiuddin, The Punjab Crisis Challenge V 
Response, liittal Publications, Delhi, 1985, pp. 48-49. 
ripped the mischief in the bud but the state administration, 
headed by Darbara Singh, showed a none halant attitude: it 
took the incident lightly, not realizing its gravity. The 
devide between Hindus and Sikhs was affecting more and more 
people and it was not a law and order problem alone. The 
situation in the wake of Jagat Narain's murder began to 
deteriorate, with the Punjabi Press adding fuel to the fire. 
The blame for these murders was placed, by the government, 
on Bhindrawale and Sikh extremist and Press also created the 
same impression . 
Warrants were issued for arrest Df Bhindrawale who 
was in Chandu Kalan. Darbara Singh informed 'Bhajan Lai the 
Haryana Chief Minister about it and sought his assistance in 
serving the warrants. But he had already been instructed by 
Zail Singh on the Phone to allow Bhindrawale to leave. 
Bhindrawale was arrested in the murder case of Lala 
Jagat Narain, but the way he was arrested, interrogated and 
later on released by the government made him a hero and 
exposed the unseriousness of the government. Bhinderawale 
became more bold and issued militant statements indirectly 
landing these murders. Organisations such as Dal Khalsa, 
Akhand Kirtam Jatna and National Council of Khalistan 
became more active. Most of these organisations operated 
from within the Golden Temple complex. As two confidents of 
11. Ibid. 
Bhindrawale were arrested, he came to Golden Temple Amritsar 
and declared Dhram Yudh ' Morcha for their release. 
Police failure to catch the murderers led to increase 
in violence. Even factional rivalries and inside Gurdwara 
Politics led to murder. In this class fell the murder of 
the President of Delhi Gurdawara Probandhak Committee, 
Jathendrar Santosh Singh. In December 1982 the terrorists 
started the killing of their targets in the police force. 
The climax was reached when on April 25, 1983 Mr. Atwal, 
DIG, Amritsar was shot dead when he came out of the Golden 
Temple followed by Criminal in action and the police did not 
even dare tD remove the body Df their DIG till they got 
permission from Temple authorities. Several hours elapsed 
before a murder FIR was registered. This was the law to 
which police moral descended due to government's illegal 
1° 
orders . 
At this stage in Punjab it was overpowering fear, 
which made police men apparent accomplices of extremists. If 
a DIG could be killed with impunity it was child's play to 
liquidate not only a lower ranking policeman but even his 
family. Officer's wives fell Dn the feet of the extremists 
to get their husband's names remove from the hit list. A few 
senior officers like one S.S.P. Amritsar started taking 
orders from the Golden Temple rather than from the Governor 
12. N.S. Saksena, Terrorism History and Facts in the Third 
World and in India. Abhinav Publications, New Delhi, 
1985, p. 182. 
of the State1". 
The denigration of security forces was going on 
systematically and continuously at the hands of government, 
which later threw hints that these forces were not eaual to 
their task. Only one example will suffice, while 
Bhindrawale was charged with murder he came to Delhi like a 
conquering hero, accompanied by his followers with 
unlicensed weapons and paraded the street of Delhi. There 
are scores of other examples to show that every police 
operation or lack of mandatory legal action has a political 
guideline. The three sacred books of the police, the IPC, 
Cr.PC. and Police rules became irrelevant. This led to total 
demoralization of the Punjab Police and it became a. 
contingents of CRF'P and B5F had to be brought in to maintain 
i 4 
a peace in the state . 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS IN PUNJAB : 
Punjab is the richest state in India with the highest 
per capita income. The Punjab economy recorded a very high 
rate of growth during the sixties. This growth was so high 
because of green revolution. The green revolution has 
resulted in an uneven development not Dnly in different 
regions of the state but also for the population within a 
region. The unevenness has resulted in a growing 
13. Satyapal Dang, Genesis of Terrorism. Patriot 
Publishers, New Delhi, 1988, p. 19. 
14. Ibid. 
popularization in marginal and poor peasants, thus adding to 
the army of the landless, who had no employment avenues in 
urban areas. The number of the landless have doubled and 
those of the marginal peasants has increased three times in 
the past ten years or so. With capital intensive 
agriculture workforce rose from 17.3 percent in 1961 to 
32 percent in 1971 and the figure is around 40 percent 
15 now. . 
The inequalities in land distribution have also 
accentuated considerably while the percentage of small 
holding is the lowest in Punjab, the percentage of large 
holding is the highest, the fruits of the green revolution 
appear to have been grabbed by just 20 percent of Jat 
landlords who own move than 60 percent of the total land. 
The fruits of the green revolution appear to have been 
or?bbPH by just 20 percent of Jat landlords who own more 
than 60 percent of the total land. This top group consists 
mostly of capitalist farmers who employees wage workers. 
They also have the benefit Df institutional credit at cheap 
rates through their political connection . 
This factor facilitated the cause of terrorism in 
Punjab. 
15. Cf. Harish Puri, "Socio Political Basis of Akali 
Agitation", Economic and Political Weekly, January 22, 
1983. 
16. G.S. Bhalla and Y.K. Alag, "Green Revolution and Small 
Peasants : A Study of income Distribution in Punjab 
Agriculture", EPW, May 22, 1982, p. 876. 
RELIGIOUS FACTORS : 
This factor also led terrorism in Pun .jab. They 
claimed separate religion from that of Hindu religion. 
Article 25 of the constitution has been burnt by them 
because they were included as Hindu's under Article 25 of 
the constitution of India. 
Religion farmed the basis of their separatism. It is 
the religion which provides them separate ethnic identity. 
Their identification as Hindu by Indian constitution was not 
acceptable to them. Religion became so dominant. in Punjab 
that the movement drew its moral strength from it. 
The terrorist activities continued to escalate in 
Punjab. Not only the internal factors were the responsible 
for escalation of terrorism but external support was also a 
main cause for providing sustenance to the terrorism in 
Punjab. In the primary stage arms were supplied mainly by 
Pakistan but in the later stage, mainly China and U.S. and 
those Sikhs living abroad provided all kinds of help, 
ranging from material to moral. ' Such foreign support of 
the Punjabi terrorist made it easy for them to carry on 
terrorist activity not only in Punjab but another parts of 
the country as well. The terrorist activities paralyzed the 
civil administration, reducing it to almost ineffective 
existence. Terrorism where demoralized, both 
17. V.D. Chopra, R.K. Misra and Nirmal Singh (ed.) Agony of 
Punjab. US Pak Collusion : The Punjab Theatre. Patriot 
Publishers, New Delhi, 1984, p. 125. 
psychologically and morally, the civil administration, it 
also created communal rift, and the distrust among the 
dominant communities of the state of Punjab, Hindus and 
Sikhs. 
When method employed to check the terrorism failed 
and terrorist activities continued to escalate, paralyzing 
the general functioning of the society, making the peaceful 
existence in possible and discrediting the government as 
ineffective not able to deal effectively with the terrorist, 
the government took on strong actions bringing army in the 
state to meet out the threat posed by the terrorist. The 
religious places were being used by terrorists as their 
sanctuaries and base work carrying out the terrorist 
activities. They took some drastic steps to flush out 
terrorist from the religious places. 
OPERATION BLUE STAR : 
When all methods to check terrorism failed, the 
centre government took a drastic step to flush out 
terrorists from the Golden Temple. The military action 
called "Operation Blue Star". 
From October 1983 onwards the extremists started the 
Golden Temple Complex into a fort and there was large scale 
storing of arms and ammunition. In this stage of chaos and 
confusion habitual criminals and smugglers joined the 
extremists. There are reasons to believe that extravagant 
hopes were given to them by Pakistan agents and CIA that 
once they made a bold declaration of Khalistan and capturea 
power in Punjab, out side forces would come to their help. 
Meanwhile, silent negotiations were going between the 
congress and Akalis only very late in May 1984, the 
government woke up to the reality that army more delay may 
be fatal and it was only then the "Operation Blue Star" was 
launched18. 
The army moved into Punjab and Chandigarh on June 2, 
1984 and under took the task of putting down the orgy of 
terror let loose by extremist and terrorist elements and 
assisting the civil authorities in restoration of peace and 
normalcy. "Operation Blue Star" took place on June 5, 1984 
against the Bhindrawale activities. The army entered the 
Golden Temple, to purge it of the hundreds of armed 
terrorists. More than 24 hour battle fought in the premises 
of this serene shrine left behind a trail of over 500 
terrorists killed and 100 injured over 1000 were captured. 
The army lost about 100 officers and Jawans. Another 100 
soldiers were seriously wounded. The militant Sikh leader 
Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindrawale was also killed in action. 
Arms and ammunition in large Quantity were found in the 
19 Golden Temple 
The swift and phased action taken by the army 
personnel under the over all command of lieutenant General 
18. N.S. Saksena, Qo.Cit. p. 182. 
19. Abida Smiuddin, Op.Cit. p. 156. 
K. Sunder Ji and the guidance of lieutenant General R.S. 
Dayal, Security advisor to the Governor of Punjab in 
flushing out of the armed terrorists and hardened criminals 
hide-outs in the Golden Temple Complex. 
The "Operation Blue Star" did hurt the Sikh 
sentiment in the country and abroad. In protest against 
entry of the army into the Golden Temple. Khushwant Singh, a 
noted Scholar and Journalist returned the title of Padam 
Bhusan to the Government. Many other highly placed Sikhs 
also expressed their resentment by resigning the posts held 
by them. 
However terrorism was not eliminated, murders of 
Hindu and Sikhs were continued long after the entering to 
the holy shrine, killing of the innocent and used grenades, 
rifles, mortars, guns, missiles, and even anti-rocket dumped 
for sometime post in holy places'"' . 
"Operation Blue Star" helped in flushing out 
terrorists from the Golden Temple, but it accelerated the 
momentum of terrorism in Punjab. Sikhs Sentiments were 
badly hurt by Blue Star Operation which continued to reflect 
in the form increased violence in the Punjab as well as in 
other parts of India. 
Sukhdev Prasad Baranwal, Military Year Book. 1984-85. 
p. 17. 
MILITANT ORGANIZATION IN PUNJAB AND THEIR FOREIGN LINKAGES : 
There were several militant Droanisations for 
example. National Council of Khalistan Dal Khalsa, Babber 
Khalsa, Akand Kirtani Jatha, Khalistan Commando Force, All 
India, Sikh Students Federation (AISSF) and the Bhindrawale 
Force, which fought for the liberation of Khalistan or 
Punjab. 
Bhindrawale also had his own group centered at the 
holy place near Bhatinda called Damdam Sahib where he 
resided. The group has committed a number of terrorist 
acts. 
The National Council of Khalistan was an umbrella 
organization which was a government in exile in name only. 
It serve as a coordinating body for distributing 
information promoting the Khalistani cause. The central 
organization operated from Khalistan House, situated in well 
to do Bayswater near Hyde Park in London. It has branches 
in various parts of the world. Funds for the NCK come from 
Sikh businessmen in Canada, the USA and the U.K. Money is 
contributed at meetings in Gurdawaras and by direct 
contributions. After the army action in Golden -Temple 
(Operation Blue Star) a much broader cross section of the 
Sikh community were willing to give money to Khalistan 
organization. 
The pro Khalistani groups were sprouted up in various 
Darts of the world where sikhs live. Many Khalistani 
organization were based in U.K. including Dr. Chauhar, s 
another famous organistion is the International Sikh Youth 
Federation \'ISYF) founded by a Sardar Jasbir Singh relative 
of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindrawale after the "Blue Star 
Operation" in 1984. Another important Centre for 
Khalistanis was Vancouver. British Columbia, Canada where 
more than two third of Canadian Sikhs live. Atleast three 
important Khalistanis were living there. One was Surjan 
Singh Gill, the publishers of the Indo-Canadian Times and 
the Newsletter Babber Khalsa, and in the U.S. Ganga Singh 
Dhillon of Washington who was known to be the close friend 
of then Pakistani President Ziaul HaaiA. He also propagated 
that the Sikhs are a separate nation and maintained contacts 
with U.S. Senators and persons in the higher ranks of 
Pakistani administration^"". There may be some other 
militant organisations but few were affective and actively 
operative for carrying out violence in Punjab. 
MAJOR INCIDENCE OF TERRORISM IN PUNJAB : 
Although terrorism in Punjab was successfully 
combated. Terrorist basically employing the methods of 
extortion, bombing assassination and indiscriminate killing 
carried out violence in Punjab and the other parts of the 
country. However thousands of terrorists incidence took 
place in Punjab, here I would like to mention few of them. 
21. India Today, Nov. 30, 1981, p. 104. Col. 2. 
22. White Paper on the Punjab Agitation, Government of 
India, July 10, 1984, p. 37. 
EXTORTION AND LOOTING : 
As terrorism for its survival depends on the economic 
support and financing, the collection of money by means of 
extortion and looting becomes the essential part of 
terrorism. In Punjab this method was increasingly used by 
the terrorists. Not only looting, of banks and other such 
places but also looting of buses and trains were carried out 
by the terrorist. Terrorist not only employed this method 
within the boundaries of Punjab but also at other places, 
even, Delhi was not spared, banks were also looted there. 
On Etecember 6, 19B5, in renewed spurt of violent 
activities, terrorists looted a bus, robbed a bank, snatched 
a mobbed and set on fire another bus in separate incident, 
in Punjab. In the first incident four suspected terrorists 
early this morning looted passengers of a Chandigarh bus of 
the Punjab Road-ways near Batala. In the second incident, 
six armed men, for among them stated to be clean shaved 
storm into a Ludhiana branch of India overseas Bank and 
looted Rs. 1.5 Lakh at Pistol point. The robbers managed to 
escape a fiat car after firing at the banks security guard. 
The guard was injured in the incident*-"'. 
On February 24, 19B6, a government Railway Police 
post at TranTaran in Amritsar district was raided by alleged 
terrorists, who took away 16 rifles and nearly 500 live 
23. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, December 7 1985. 
cartridges. The weapons 303 rifles, belonged to a home 
guards unit attached to the railway police according to 
report received, four armed men, in Khaki uniform, came in a 
Jeep to said the GRF post around 2.00 A.M. They gained 
entry through a window, line up the men on guard duty in a 
corner with their faces to the wall and escaped with their 
loot. However, according to the district police chief. 
Mr.S.S. Virk, the terrorists came dressed in Police uniform. 
They told the home guard Jawan sleeping in the room that 
they had come with a message for them. As the Jawan opened 
the door, the terrorists, armed with stenguns and revolvers, 
forced their way into the room. 
Five suspected armed terrorists looted a rural branch 
of Punjab and Sindh Bank at Nathuwala Village under the 
Baghapurana Police Station, in this sub-division shortly 
after noon on 26th Feb.. 19S6. District Police Chief told 
newsmen that the five, who escaped on a waiting blue 
coloured Jeep, earlier tried to loot the branch of the 
Central Cooperative Bank in the same village, but changed 
their plans, probably on seeing a large number of 
customers . 
One of the major incidence of looting which was 
carried out by terrorist evolved around seventy crores of 
rupees from one of the bank in Punjab. Besides looting 
February, 25, 19B6. 
Feb. 27, 1986. 
24. Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 
25. Hindustan Times, New Delhi. 
banks, terrorists also extorted money from industrialist and 
other rich persons by threatening them to kill if they do 
not oblise the terrorist and even, sometimes by abducting 
them. Looting also involved the snatching away the arms and 
ammunition from the stores and sometimes from the para 
troopers carrying them. This was the one of the method 
Punjabi terrorist frequently employed for carrying out 
violence in Punjab. 
BOMBING AND EXPLOSION : 
Bombing and explosion is the method which was 
frequently and effectively employed by the terrorist. They 
carried out violence at the extensively by using bombs and 
explosive. No place particularly public places, bus 
departs, Railway stations and market places where left 
untargeted by them. Buses, trains and even aeroplanes were 
exploded by planting bombs on them. The major air crash 
which was done by terrorist was the Air India Jumbo Jet 
Kamshka, air explosion in June 23, 19B5, in which all the 
passengers were killed in the incident*" . 
Another incident was Gurdeep Singh Sehgal, an alleged 
terrorist who had been absconding since the transistor bomb 
blasts in Northern India last May was arrested by the 
operations cell of the Delhi Police on 13th Feb., 1986. 
26. D.P. Sharma, Countering Terrorism. Lancer Books, New 
Delhi, 1992, pp. 27-28. 
Investigation revealed that Sehgal had conspired with Kartar 
Singh Narang and others to manufacture transistor bombs and 
then plant their in various parts of the capital. He is 
alleged to have contributed money regularly to procure the 
plastic casings and the exp losi ves2-7 . 
Terrorists also carried out few big explosions at the 
railway stations and even in the buses, killing thousands of 
innocent lives, instilling terror among the public, giving 
the extortion that no place is save or away from the reaches 
of terrorists. One of the important thing in this spare of 
activity for which the Punjabi terrorist gained popularity 
was the effective employment of transistor and toy bombs. 
This methodology adopted by terrorist in Punjab besides in 
generating fear in the societies also helped in propagating 
their cause and credibility among the followers of 
terrorism. 
ASSASSINATION : 
Assassination was also used as a means for carrying 
out violence in Punjab and the other parts of the country as 
well. by the terrorist. Terrorist assassinated few of the 
very important personalities of India besides many others 
who were considered by them as road blocks in their cause. 
On August 20, 1985 Harchand Singh Longwal President 
of the Akali Dal (Longwal Faction), was assassinated by the 
27. Hindustan Times, New Delhi. Feb., 25, 1986. 
terrorist. Herchand Singh Longwa.l supported and stooges; 
with those fighting for the separation of Punjab from India. 
He later on in 1985 signed an agreement with Rajiv Gandhi, 
the then Prime Minister of India for the resolution of 
conflict in Punjab. After the signing he tookup the cause 
of supporting the maintenance of peace, law and order in the 
Punjab. The agreement was not to be satisfaction of 
terrorist, so considering Longwal as betrayer assassinated 
no 
him-'' . Lala Jagat Narayan a prominent personality of Punjab 
who was against the policies of Akali and the terrorist was 
also assassinated"" 6en. Vaidya who was entrusted with the 
task of combating terrorism in Punjab was also later on 
assassinated in Pune. 
A significant assassination which created almost 
national crisis was of Mrs. Indira Bandhi the then Prime 
Minister of India. It was a path that she knew well, a 
daily walk of 10 to 15 seconds at her brisk, no nonsense 
pace from her home Safdarjung Road to neighbouring Akbar 
Road for a daily darshan with the Public, or an early 
morning meeting with a visiting dignitary or an interview 
with a news man. On October 31, 1984 the darshan had been 
canceled and Mrs. Gandhi's appointment was with well known 
actor and writer Peter Ustinov. His crew was to record an 
interview for Irish T.V. 
28. The Illustrated Weekly of India. September 8-14, 1985, 
p. 8. 
29. Abida Samiuddin., Op.Cit, p. 49. 
The drastic assassination of Prime Minister Mrs. 
Indira Gandhi on morning October 31, 19B4 by their own 
security guards when she was just about to cross from the 
Safdarjung Road House to the Akbar Road Bungalow. She died 
in the one contingency that her legion of security 
officials, had been unable to guard against : traitors from 
within her own security guards. That it did points to a deep 
conspiracy one that could only have been planned by those 
who had a very good ideas of the P.M.'s movements and 
security conditions. Sub-Inspector Beant Singh and 
constable Satwant Singh were probably just cogs in an 
ominously efficient manner. Beant Singh stationed at the 
gate, greeted Mrs. Gandhi as usual opened the gate but 
before she could step forward he whipped out his pistol and 
shot her from less than three feet away. It was 9.16 a.m. 
Mrs. Gandhi cried out and slumped to the ground. As if on 
cue, Satwant Singh instantly sprang from the other side and 
using his Thompson carbide in rapid fire position, riddled 
her Prostrate body with 20 rounds. Mrs. Gandhi transitioned 
from Vibrant life to near death, felled by no fewer than 25 
bullets that at such close quarters could not but find their 
mark with uncamng, lethal accuracy. 
The five men who escorted the P.M. and were the only 
eye witnesses were equally stunned. The Umbrella fell, and 
they looked on helplessly. The only people who seemed to 
know exactly what was required of them were the two 
assailtants who immediately dropped their arms and raised 
their hands in surrender. Said sub-inspector Beant Sinph 
defiantly as he surrendered. "Hame JD karna tha Kar Diya, 
Tumme Jo Kama hai karo", <I have done what I had to do. now 
you do what you have to do).°° 
The carnage that swept so much of the national 
capital and part of the country was an unprecedented uniform 
reaction to the slaying of P.M. Indira Bandhi. For the 
first time, it was the Delhi region, protected and pampered, 
that bore the brunt of the anger and the orchestrated, 
myopic reprisals against the Sikhs. If fortunately, it was 
less murderous in the states, the worst was in the Hindi 
speaking northern and central state of Bihar, Uttar pradesh, 
Madhya Pradesh and Haryana. The pattern, most vivid and 
bloody in Delhi was nauseatingly repeated elsewhere 
Spontaneous arson and destruction at first taken over by 
criminally led hoodlums who killed Sikhs, looted or burnt 
their homes and properties while the police twiddled their 
thumbs. In desperation and fear. Sikhs vanished from the 
streets and in traumatic acts of self-preservation, shed 
their turbans, cut their hair and shaved their beards. The 
toll around the countries remains uncounted and tens of 
thousands have been crammed into hastily put together-
refugee camps and a benumbed country is only just beginning 
to grasp the magnitude of the violence, it has inflicted 
30. India Today. Nov. 30, 1984. p. 16. 
upon itself. Reports have also poured in from all over the 
Hindus Doing to the help of Sikhs, of saving neighbours and 
friends, even strangers from the fury of the Lumpen elements 
that made up the killers and looters while in northern 
India, the overwhelming reaction was of mobs turning on 
innocent, in southern India there was a unique atonement. 
The Police in Delhi, Kanpur, etc. was under the 
impression that anti Sikh riot had approval of the 
government and a few good police officers, who opened fire 
to save the Sikhs from being massacred, were under the 
general apprehension that they might be Dunished. This 
impression was removed only after it was broadcast that 
Rajiv Gandhi had personally toured the affected areas in 
Delhi and given order that the rioters must be ruthlessly 
suppressed. This healthy impression disappeared against 
when Rajiv Gandhi gave a Public Speech in which he said that 
when a big tree falls there are tremors in the earth. The 
deaths toll reached 1000 in Delhi. 117 in U.P., 200 in 
Bihar. 87 in MP. 60 in Haryana and 15 in Maharashtra. A few 
well motivated police officers did their best but. by and 
large, the administration did not respond as energetically 
as they should have done. 
TARGET : RAJIV GANDHI : 
His accession to the nation's highest political 
office came in the tragic wake of the most henious act of 
terrorism on the sub continent. Since the Mahatma over 
three decades age, and in a briefing room of U.£. state 
Department in Washington, it stood revealed that Ra.iiv 
Gandhi was to be the victim of a fresh rasn of terrorist-
attack that were intended to rock the foundation of the 
world's largest democracy. Paving the way. for what the 
terrorists hoped, would be the creation of the sovereign 
state of Khalistan. What had saved the day. according to 
the state department was the efforts of the Federal Bureaue 
of Investigation (FBI) in Smashing the plot, largely due to 
the legwork of one of its under cover agents. 
Clearly. the plot as out lined by the FBI director, 
William webster, on May 13, revealed that a group of Sikh 
terrorists had been plotting the assassination of the 
Haryana Chief Minister Bha.jan Lai, who was on a private 
visit to New Orleans and also Ra.iiv Gandhi. who is stated 
to visit the U.S. in early June, 1985 to Kick off eagerly 
awaited festival of India. Apart from these destardly 
deeds, the terrorists were attempting to begin, prepare a 
means for. and take part in military expedition ana 
enterprise against India. Details later showed that their 
strategy was to detonate high powered explosives at a 
nuclear facility, bridges and government buildings and also 
wreck shrines to create anarchy'*' . 
Four Sikhs accused of conspiracy to assassinate Prime 
31. Illustrated Weekly. June 2-S, 19S5, p. S. 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi during his visit to Britain had 
planned to here killers from Irish Republican Army (IRA), 
Prosecutor James England has alleged. Prosecutor said that 
three of the accused met. what they thought were members of 
the IRA in a Hotel of Leicester. A Secret tape-recording 
was made of Marwaha saying that funds were available for the 
killing from international Sikh Youth Federation of which he 
was the treasurer. 
Three of the accused were denied bail but it was 
granted to Rai. on condition he produced two sureties of 
35,000 each and deposited a similar amount with the court'*'". 
FORMATION OF "KHALISTAN" ANNOUNCED s 
On April 28, 1986, All India Sikh Student Federation 
supported five members, "Panthic Committee" made a formal 
declaration about the establishment of "Khalistan". 
They said this would be in fulfillment of the daily 
prayer "Ra.ikarega Khalsa" as conceived by Guru Govind Singh 
in 169? and later reaffirmed by the late Jarnel Singh 
Bhindrewale. The "Panthic Committee" handed over to newsmen 
a ten page typed statement to this effect. Replying to 
Questions, the member of the committee said that Delhi would 
be headauarters of Khalistan and their Flag would fly over 
the Red Fort. They had not yet drawn up the boundaries of 
32. Hidustan Times. New Delhi. Feb. 21. 1985. 
the state, but the "Khalistan Cabinet" includinp the "Prime 
Minister" and its President' would be announced soon. 
They said that Khalsa Panth would soon seek formal 
recognition by all other countries particularly the USA. 
the U.K. Pakistan China. Canada, West Germany France, Japan, 
Sri Lanka, Burma, Bangladesh, Israil, Equador, besides other 
members of the U.N. 
"It would seek Recognition from India too" and also 
strive for economic and military aid from some of the 
friendly countries. 
The "Panthic Committee" meeting warned the opponents 
of "k.halistan" that their "misdeed" would be overlooked and 
that they would be properly dealt with. It used the 
expression "Sudhai Kiti Javegi" meaning that they would not 
be spared. It directed all Sikhs lodged in /jail to remain 
firm in this goal and said the "Panthic Committee" would do 
its dutv to remove their difficulties"-'. 
Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan self styled president of 
Khalistan is the most well known and vociferous Khalistan 
protagonist in London, a man who is almost Utopian in his 
dream of establishing it in India. The man who announce a 
prize for assassination of late Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi. it was broadcast. bv the British Broadcasting 
33. The Times of India. New Delhi. April 29. 1986. 
Corporation (BBC). He started Khalistan movement single 
handedly in 1968. 
Another is Dildar Singh Bains the richest Indian in 
the U.S.A. it is alleged that he stayed in Rashtrapati 
Bhawan as a guest of president Zail Singh, when Rajiv Gandhi 
visited the U.S.A.. Bains flew from San Francisco to 
Washington to supervise the demonstration out side White 
House where Ronald Reaoon president of USA was formally 
welcoming the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi. 
These Indian terrorists have got citizenship in 
U.S.A., England, and other Western countries. They collect 
money and send it to India, arrange training for terrorist 
and send them to India. They excite the Sikhs creating 
problem for them as well as for the Indian Government. The 
Indian government has protested many times in past to keep 
check and ban illegal activities of these person" . 
Terrorism as a political techniaue was employed by 
the practitioners of terrorism in Punjab. The cause in 
Punjab besides many others was mainly the independence of 
Punjab from the state of India. To achieve this objective, 
they took up the aims and found terrorism as a reasonable 
way for them to carry the violence against the state of 
India. The lacking in strength to fight the Indian state in 
open combat chosen terrorism as a means to carry out 
violence for political purpose. 
34. Prove India. August. 1985, pp. 8-10. 
B - MILITANCY AND TERRORISM IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR : 
It was called by a Mughal emperor as "paradise on 
earth", the beautiful valley of Kashmir has lately been 
rocked by bomb blast. shootings and other -subversive 
elements, trained with arms equipments by Pakistan have been 
causing havoc in that state. There is intense fear among 
the people. The militants have created tough law and order-
problem for the state administration. The remoteness of the 
valley of Kashmir has helped to promote a feeling of special 
identity not only because it has discouraged the mass influx 
of new settlers, but also because it has restricted the 
Kashmir's contact with the outside world. Confinement to a 
relatively small area for generations has produced an 
unusual degree of cultural and racial homogenei tv'1- . 
The militant violence spearheaded by the JKLF men, 
was first perpetrated from the year 1988, with the exploding 
of a bomb in the central telegraph office, Srinagar. Next 
day, on August I, 1988, another bomb was exploded in the 
Srinagar club. Again Dn August 31, 1988. a powerful bomb 
exploded in an empty bus at Anantnag bus stand killing one 
person and injuring two who were standing near the bus. 
This was the third bomb blast in a month. The militants 
mainly struck on empty vehicles, official buildings and 
uncrowded places. But gradually it turned to large scale 
35. Kaiumuddin, Kashmir its Cultural Heritage. Asian 
Publishing House, Bombay, 1952, pp. 3-4. 
destruction. killing, ma idlings, kidnapping etc. The 
Kalashmkov culture boomed on all sides in the valley. For 
this, the then chief minister Dr. Farooa Abdullah, at first 
accused Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq and others like his estranged 
brother in law G.M. Shah the "Jana Morcha" of Mufti Mohammad 
-if / 
Sayeed, MUF etc. "'c But subsequently he was convinced that 
Pakistan was encouraging subversion in Kashmir. 
By the end Df 198? violence had acauired ominous 
proportions. Dr. Farooq Abdullah in September 1989 stated 
that one hundred and seventy bomb blasts and one hundred and 
sixty cases of exchange of fire between the police and 
militants had taken place in the state . The militants 
through frequent explosions, killings, kidnapping and bandhs 
rendered the entire state machinery dispirited and 
demoralized. The incompetence and inefficiency of the 
state police was fully exposed. The militants mostly 
attacked the central government concerns, security forces 
(Army BSF, CRPF, Police etc.) VIP houses, airport, bridges, 
roads, transformation, radio station. Door Darshan, Post and 
Telegraph offices, press. school banks, party offices, 
cinemas etc. The civilian targets were attacked either to 
force social reforms or to provoke cross firing. 
Dr. Farooq Abdullah s image was tarnished by the use 
of force against the militants in the valley. He became a 
36. Udavan Sharma, Sunday. Vol. 15, September. 11-17, 1988. 
p. 44. 
37. M.M. Khajooria, "Spawning the Master of Terrorism. in 
The Kashmir Times. September, 4, 1989. 
major target particularly after January E, 1990 when the 
security forces shot dead 13 persons and 1n.71.1red over 100 to 
Quell mob violence. Strikes and bandhs were organized to 
protest against police repression. The militants retaliated 
and hanged a CRPF Jawan. killed three central Intelligence 
Bureau <IB) officials. Senior officers of the Kashmir 
police were also intimidated and their families attacked. 
Since then the situation has been deteriorating. 
On January 19, 1990 a new Governor Mr. Jagmohan was 
appointed. Jagmohan, it may be recapitulated, during his 
first term as Governor of Jammu and Kashmir (1984-88) had 
acted against Dr. Farooq Abdullah and replaced his 
government by a minority regime of G.M. Shah in July 1984. 
Therefore Dr. Abdullah in reaction to Mr. Jagmohan's new 
appointment resigned from the Chief Ministership on the same 
day. The state's administrations was thus left to the 
Governor. 
However. contrary to expectations, the new governor 
failed to combat the growing menace of violence. Instead it 
became more intense and widespread. Moreover, the excessive 
use of force had alienated most of the Muslims from his 
regime. He rejected all hitherto "Soft" and "Permissive" 
attitude of the state and decided to "Stand firm against the 
browbeating and bullying tactics . But this hard-line 
38. Indranil Banerjee, "Flash Point". Sunday. Vol. 17. 4. 
January 28-3. February, 1990, p. 11 
option oroved disastrous. People freauently mobDed the 
streets and his detractors showered on him epithets such as 
"Hallaqu". "Cheng IZ Khan", "anti Kashmiri" "ant i-mus 1 im" 
etc. His entire drive against militancy provided prist to 
the Propaganda mill of the militants and their Pakistani 
supporters. However, the abused hurled pn Jagmohan were not 
•free from Political considerations. In fact, conditions at 
the time of his /joining had completely deteriorated. 
Information furnished to the Parliament revealed that the 
Phenomenon of violence had become serious even prior to the 
Kidnapping of Dr. Rubiaya Sayeed on December 8. 1989. As 
many as 1600 violent incidents. including. 351 bombs 
.39 
explosions, too*: place in the state in the year 1989 . -By 
August 19S9, the militants, with one anonymous call "could 
order a complete 'bandh' for nearly two weeks. Even a 
congress minister dared not defy it. The civic staff too 
saw safety in switching off streetlights on August 15 to 
observe black day and some high ranking officials absented 
themselves from the flag hoisting ceremony by the Chief 
40 Minister ". Between January I and January 19. 199u there 
were as many as 319 violent act 21 armed attacks. 114 bomb 
41 blasts. 112 arson and 72 incidents of mob violence. . All 
this. however, does not mean that Mr. Jagmohan can be 
absolved of all responsibility. 
39. Jagmohan, Mv Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir. Allied 
Publishers, New Delhi, 1991. p. 342 
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However, the change of Governor did not bring any 
Qualitative change in the situation. Despite lots of 
killing and arrests of militants (as many as 700 militants 
killed and over 5,000 arrested between January 1990 and May 
1991) there was no respite from violence. On many 
occasions, the toll of violence rather escalated. 
In Sopore town on January 6, 1993 over 44 persons 
were killed and property worth crores of rupees destroyed. 
Over 200 shops and houses were razed to the ground in 
retaliation. On January 6, 1993 the militants fired and 
launched a grenade attack on the picket of BSF in Sopore 
town. Two BSF men were seriously injured (one of them later 
succumbed to his injuries) and a couple of weapons seized 
4° from the picket. 
The authorities have also been accused of custodial 
killings and "Catch and Kill" policy. This created greater 
sympathy and support for the militants. As a matter of 
fact, protected use of security forces has been counter 
productive and has had dangerous consequences. One fall out 
of this was that the inward looking Kashmiri Muslims. 
including localized Muslims middle class, which so far 
favoured the National Conference in the valley, started 
sympathizing with the militants. Even the frame work of 
Article 370 seemed inadeouate to them. Liberation from 
42. M.L. Kak "Sooore Fire Toll 65: Prove Ordered", in The 
Tribune. January 8, 1993. 
India emerged as the dominant ideology appearing to many 
Muslims in the valley particularly in the years 1990 and 
1991. People's anger against the authorities not only came 
as a shot in the arm of the militants, but also helped the 
rulers across the border in intensifying their anti-Indian 
lobbying by accusing her of holding Kashmir by force. 
The Jammu and Kashmir Governor (Retd.) Gen. K.V. 
Krishna Rao, said; the Pakistan after having failed to grab 
J and K through open wars, has now waged a. proxy war to 
annex Kashmir. It has been aiding and abetting terrorism by-
training and arming some of the misguided youth . 
He also declared that during the past five years, 
there have been seised more than 20,000 weapons thousands of 
grenades, lakhs of ammunition rounds and other assortment of 
ammunition which were supplied to militants by Pakistan to 
44 
create large scale violence . And still the incidents of 
utter lawlessness, such as bomb blasts, arson and 
destruction of property have become freauent. There are 
more signs of Panic and nervousness among the people than of 
return to normalcy. 
Along with the increasing fear and deep anxiety, 
there is intense anti Indian feeling, which is naturally a 
matter of great concern. For this state of affairs there 
43. The Hindustan Times. December 27, 1994. 
44. Ibid. 
are two main causes one the endless propaganda by the 
militants by world of mouth as well as through their own 
furtively printed propaganda sheets, besides posters on 
street walls and on poles. 
Second cause is the administration's failure to 
ensure peace and protection to the people. The local people 
and also the visitors notice the virtual collapse of the 
administration and the lack of confidence in the ruling 
elite. The occasional arrest and detentions without trial 
have caused further resentment. 
The situation in Jammu and Kashmir by the end of 198? 
developed into an "invisible war". It was not a sudden 
outburst but the cumulative result of various twists and 
turns in the state's politics since 1947. However., among 
the immediate factors which contributed to this crisis were 
: the toppling of Dr. Farooq Abdullah's government in July 
19B4; Communalisation of politics particularly under the 
minority governments of B.M. Shah (1984-86): formation of 
new combinations of fundamentalist organization is such as 
the "Muslim United Front " opportunistic alliances and 
accords between the ruling National Conference and 
Congress(I) in 1986 and 1987: electoral malpractices during 
the March 1987 Assembly elections; recurrence of ethno 
communal violence and regional agitations in different parts 
of the state; deteriorating conditions in the neighbouring 
state of Punjab, and resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism 
across the border. 
The conditions in the state deteriorated to such an 
extent that by October 1989 People in the valley were 
virtually seized by an all pervasive dread of militant 
violence. Any call from the militants for a bandh or 
"civil curfew" began to be obeyed without any resistance or 
complaint. Contrary to this, all assurances of safety from 
the government lost credibility with the people. The 
disruption as a result of heightened militant activities 
became so intense and wide-spread that the folourishing 
tourist industry was brought to a grinding halt in the 
blood-soaked valley, trade and business were badly affected, 
schools and colleges were intermittently closed, payment of 
taxes and tariffs were stopped and people daily fell prey 
either to militant violence or the cordon and search 
operations conducted by the Para-Military forces or were 
caught in the crossfiring between the two. The militants 
who identified the Indian state and its infrastructure at 
the local level as their enemy, virtually overpowered the 
state apparatus and rendered the police and local 
bureaucracy completely demoralized. Initially, they began 
by making frenzied religious propaganda, slogan shouting, 
sticking posters on walls and poles, spreading rumour and by-
killing some CRPF Jawan, Policemen. IB officials, retired 
Judges, bureaucrats, managers, politicians etc. Some close 
relations of policemen were also gunned down and their 
houses bombed. By January 1990 the state authorities lost 
control and failed to prevent the situation from Doing out 
of hand- Despite the claims of arrests. killings of 
militants and seizure of arms, ammunition and explosives by 
the government there has hardly been any let-up in violence 
and killing. kidnappings, extortions, destruction of 
property go on unabated. People are sand witched between 
gun - totting militants on the one hand and state forces on 
the others. 
The initial estimates that around 300 Kashmiri youths 
had crossed the border to receive subversive training in the 
various Pakistan camps were subsequently revised to several 
thousands. Towards the end of 1990, the then Governor, Mr. 
B.C. Sexena (Formerly head of Research and Analysis Wing). 
while speaking to the visiting media personnel said. "the 
militants have the capability tD hit. There are about 2500 
or more active militants in the valley and 4000 to 5000 
across the border waiting to come in". "' Further, he said 
that enormous caches of weapons and explosives, including 
mines had been captured and these were much larger than the 
seizures made in Punjab. He illustrated it by saying that 
in 19B9, the Central Government was alarmed at the estimates 
of intelligence agencies that there may be 500 AK - 47 
rifles with the terrorists in Punjab, in Kashmir in 1990 
alone, the security forces captured 1300 Klashnikov rifles, 
800 pistols. 400 rockets and 40 rocket launchers. 90 machine 
guns. two tones of explosives and 2,00,000 rounds of 
45. Mano.o Joshi, "Another Winter of Revolt", in Frontline. 
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ammunition. ° Governor further said that the number of 
rocket launchers and boosters, explosives, anti-tank, 
claymore and anti-personnel mines, sophisticated fuse 
systems and electronic detonation devices,VHF, (Very High 
Frequency) radio sets, compasses, binoculars, mine detectors 
and racksacks was enough even for an army . The other-
weapons included telescopic rifles <mainly to kill VIPs) 
recoiless puns to battle and render ineffective army tanks, 
armoured personnel carriers, mortars etc. The authorities 
believed that the militant outfits had also acauired 
shoulder-fired stringer missiles. The Chief of Hizbul 
Majahideen, Salah-ud-Din, also reiterated that his Jawan 
were in Position to hit the positions of Indian forces at a 
distance of seven miles and were well in a position to hit 
4fi the enemy s war plans . Like wise, a top JKLF leader even 
boasted that his organisation possessed scud missiles in its 
49 
arsenal . In December 1992. the Governor claimed that the 
security forces during the previous three years recovered 
7,000 Klashmmkov (AK type) rifles, 400 machine guns. 400 
rocket launchers. 7000 grenades and 2300 pistols. Besides 
this he said that about 2100 militants were killed and 
thousands apprehend or surrendered . However. the total 
46. The Governor's Interview to IPA, in P.N. Jalali "Talks 
-with Honour Offer to Militants", The Tribune. 
December. 20. 1990. Also see O.N. Dhar. " J & K needs a 
Political Initiative". The Hindu. March 15, 1991. 
47. Manoj Joshi, Op.cit. p. 16. 
48. Daily Submission (Srinagar), December 24, 1992. 
49. BPS Malik, "Kashmir the Valley of Darkness". in The 
Indian Express. August 25. 1991. 
50. The Economic Times,December 30, 1992. 
seised weapons by the security forces, according to some 
estimates, might not be more that 15 percent of the arsenal 
with the militant's in the valley51. 
Such a huge stock of weapons could not have been 
brought without the active involvement of the government 
across the border. In fact, the Pakistani regime which has 
become victim of "the Policy of Sustained Hostility" has 
been the major source of supplying weapons, imparting 
training to militants and framing their strategies and 
tactics. The Pakistani rulers have not attached any 
sanctity to the various agreements reached between the two 
countries from time to time. Most Pakistani leaders, right 
from Jinnah onwards, have raised a 'hue and cry over 
Kashmir with a view to sundering it from India. Some of 
them have charged India of having Procured the accession by 
fraud and violence. Mohammad Ali Jinnah once said : 
"Politically and militarily Kashmir is Pakistan s aorta 
(Sheh Rug). No independent country or nation can leave its 
aorta to the sword of the enemy . No sooner did the 
Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede his state 
to India in October 1947, than Jinnah's government sent the 
tribal raiders supported by its army into Kashmir. 
Likewise, President Ayub Khan, who considered Kashmir as 
indispensable from the point of view of Pakistan's economy, 
51. M.K. Tikku, "Kashmir today-I:Operation Tiger a 
Success" The Hindustan Times. September, 29, 1992. Also 
See, Harinder Baweja, "Kashmir : A Pox on both houses", 
India Today. Vol. XVII, March 1-15, 1992, p. 64 
52. Samuel Daid, "Self - Determination for Kashmiries : A 
Comouflage for Pak's Own Claim" in "Strategic 
Analysis". June 1990, vol. XIII. No. Ill, P. 327. 
defence and survival, planned the "Operation Gibraltar" and 
infiltrated Pak guerrillas into the valley in 1965. He 
maintained that Pakistan's claim to kashmir was impeccable. 
This apart. Z.A. Bhutto even bragged to wage a thousand-year 
war for Kashmir. Not only did he pat the hijacker of the 
Fokker Friendship plane, Hashim Qureshi in Lahore on January 
30, 1971 but his Pakistan People's Party also participated 
in the victory rally held by JKLF on February 13, 1971 tD 
celebrate the success of the hijacking. His daughter, 
Benazir Bhutto, in her "hysterical outbursts" on the 
television and other speeches harped on "free and impartial 
plebiscite" on the basis of the UN resolution of 194B. 
Moreover, Mr. Nawaz Sharif had set-up a fund with an initial 
sum of Rs. 5 crore to help the Kashmiri militants, when he 
5"* 
was chief minister of Punjab . 
Former Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's 
admission that while in office, he had funded the 
fundamentalist Jamat-e-Islami in a big way for training and 
arming terrorists for separations in Kashmir has exposed 
Islamabad's sinister plans to provide material support to 
militants despite officials denials'" . 
Present Prime Minister Ms. Benazir BhuttD has become 
more belligerent in her ulterances and promised full support 
to terrorists to end Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir. not 
53. The Times of India. March 25, 1990. 
54. "Pak Support to Ultras Exposed", The Hindustan Times. 
August 26, 1994. 
only this she has gone one more step by threaten 1 no to India 
crnr 
to face third war for Kashmir rule'""'. The aiding and 
abetting of separatist forces in Indian states by Pakistan 
are the interventional activities an the internal affairs 
of India. 
Curiously enough, whenever there is domestic or 
internal unrest in Pakistan, Jingoism on Kashmir and 
Kashmiri Muslims becomes louder. The Pakistani leadership, 
right from the very beginning has believed that a 
"continuous Muslim majority state" should have automatically 
acceded to their country. It is because of this that they 
had to indulge thrice in war (in 1947, 1965 and 1971). 
besides the present day "low cost proxy war" through support 
to the militants in Kashmir. They have reportedly ear-
marked funds for it and the Itei—Services Intelligence (ISI) 
-nd other military outfit have been supplying weapons and 
giving training to the Kashmiri youth. 
The ISI, which works under the direct control of 
military officers organizes finance, training and supply of 
arms to the militants consignments Df subversive literature 
and cassettes have also been sent to whip up anti-Indian 
feelings in Kashmir'*'0. 
Initially, the current strategy regarding 
Liberation of Kashmir, proposed by the Jamaat-e-Islami of 
Ibid. 
Extracts from Major General Mohindra s Book, "Terrorist 
Games National Play" in The Tribune, April 5. 1993. 
56. 
F'akistar. occupied Kashmir (F'OK) and sponsored bv the 
Pakistani rulers, was formulated in consultation with 
Maulana Sadduddin, Amir (chief) of the Jammu and Kashmir 
Jamaat-e-Islami; First it was discussed in a meeting between 
Maulana Abdul Bari, Amir of the Jamaat-e-Islami of POK and 
Maulana Saduddin in 1980 in a village near SriNaqar. The 
second meeting between the two Maulanas was held at the time 
of Maulana Sadduddin 's. Ha.i trip tD Saudi Arabia in 1981. 
The strategy was subsequently chalked out in detail in a 
high level meeting in Pakistan, which late Gen. Zia-ul-Haa 
and Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the e>: president also attended^''. 
The meeting came to the conclusion that an "armed crusade" 
should be launched by the local Kashmiries themselves. As a 
result, the first batch of Kashmiri youth was trained in 
Pakistan with the help of ISI in early 1982. and the second 
batch was trained in the autumn of the same year. All this 
began within months of the death of Sheikh Abdullah and the 
assumption of chief Ministership by Dr. Farooq Abdullah. 
However, nothing substantial resulted from this strategy, as 
not many leaders from Kashmir were willing to go along with 
it. Maulvi Abdul Ban during his Kashmir trio met leaders 
such as late Maulana Masoodi, Maulvi Mohammad Farooq, Sofi 
Akbar and Mirza Afzal Beg, but none Was prepared to play 
C O 
ball with the Jammat-e-Islami . 
57. Jagmohan "ISI Powerful Terrorist Group", in The Times 
of India. July 14, 1993. 
58. Extracts from Maulana Ban's Article Published in 
December 1992 in Jehad-e-Kashmir (Fortnightly, 
Published from Muzaffarabad) in The Tribune, February 
THE "TOPAC" PLAN : 
The process of instigating of local Kashmiri youth 
was again revived under a new strategy framed by the late 
President Zia-ul-Haq around mid - 1980. It is believed that 
the late Gen. Zia had worked out a Plan called "Operation 
Topac" (named after Topac Amin an Inca Prince, who fought a 
non- conventional war against Spanish rule in the 18th 
century Uruguay^'. In April 1988 for nurturing local 
insurgency with the objective of establishing an independent 
state by liberating the Kashmir valley from Indian 
domination. The late president did not find much sense in 
the earlier "ham - handed" military options. He instead 
decided to exploit India's "internal vulnerabilities" . 
This new strategy, which was entrusted to the Field 
Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the Pakistan army, palyed. 
••••'qnif icant r d e in generating and sustaining the current 
violence in Kashmir. The major components of this three 
phased "Topac" plan were as follows . 
PHASE I 
Promote a low level insurgency against the state 
59. Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, Pp.Cit. 
p. 406. 
60. Ibid, p. 406. 
61. Maj. Gen. M.L. Pop 1i (Retd.) "Pakistan's Game Plan for 
Kashmir, Punjab", The Link. Vol.33. May 12. 1991, P. 5. 
Also see the Te>:t of General Zia's Speech of April 
1988. at Islamabad in the Indian Defence Review. July 
1989; Strategic Analysis. Vol. XIII, No. II May 1990. 
pp. 181 - 183: O.N. Dhar,"Will Pakistan Repeart 1965 
Operation ? The Stateman. Feb., 20, 1990; and Jagmohan, 
Op.Clt. pp. 408-410. 
government. so that it is Under siege, but does not 
collapse and fall under central rule. 
Place chosen men in all the key positions to subvert 
the police force, financial institutions, the 
communication network and other important 
organizations. 
Whip up anti-India feelings amonqst the students & 
peasants, preferably on some religious issues. in 
order tc enlist active support for rioting and anti-
government demonstrations. 
Organize and train subversive elements and armed 
groups with capabilities, initially to deal with 
para-military forces located in the valley. In-
collaboration with Sikh extremists, create chaos and 
terror in Jammu and divert attention from the valley 
at a critical juncture and discredit the regime even 
in the Hindu mind. 
Establish virtual control in those parts of the 
Kashmir valley where the Indian Army is not located 
or deployed. The Southern Kashmir valley may be one 
such region. 
PHASE 2 : 
Exert maximum pressure on the Siachen, Kargil and 
Rajouri Poonch sectors to force the Indian Army to 
remain engaged outside the main Kashmir valley. 
Attack and destroy base depots and headauarters 
located at Snnagar, Pattan. Kupwara, Baramulla, 
Bandipur and Chowkiwala by covert action at a given 
t i me. 
Some Afghan Mujahideen settled in 'Azad Kashmir , 
will then infiltrate in selected pocket with a view 
to extending areas of influence. 
Finally, a special force under selected retired 
officers belonging to Azad Kashmir', with the hard 
core consisting of Afghans, will be ready to attack 
and destroy airfields, radio stations, and block the 
Banihai tunnel and the Kargil leh Highway. At a 
certain stage of the operations Punjab and adjacent 
areas of Jammu and Kashmir will be under maximum in 
Pressure internally by offensive posture. 
PHASE 3 : 
Detailed plans for the "Liberations" of Kashmir 
Valley and establishment of an independent Islamic State in 
the third phase will follow. In the events of any serious 
trouble, the Chinese and other friendly power were expected 
to come to their rescue. At the end of his speech the late 
president Zia-ul-Haq, said : 
"I wish to caution you once more that it will be 
disastrous to believe that we can take on Inaia in a 
straight context. We must therefore, be careful and 
maintains a low military profile so that the Indians 
do not find an excuse to pre empt us, by attacking at 
a time and at a point of their own choosing at least 
before Phase 1 and 2 of the operation are over, we 
must pause and assess the course of operations after 
each phase, as our strategy and plans may require 
drastic changes in certain circumstances"0''"-. 
While dismissing the importance of electoral methods 
to capture power in Kashmir, Gen. Zia stressed "it would be 
unrealistic to believe that the MUF or any such organ 1 rat ion 
can seise power through democratic means''0"'. He 
concentrated on the aforesaid scheme and intended to follow 
it vigorously for the liberation of Kashmir. Emphasis was 
ostensibly laid on liberation than on merging the state with 
Pakistan with a view to neutralising the tendency among some 
Kashmiri Muslims for Independence. 
While on the other side, India argues that both 
legally and constitutionally J and K is a part of India 
since the state acceded to the Union of its own free will. 
The instrument of accession was signed by the Mahara.ia Df 
Kashmir. Since J and K is an internal part of India, there 
is no dispute as such over Kashmir. But Pakistan insists 
62. Koshur Samachar. Vol. XXXII. March 3, 1990, pp. 9-10. 
63. Ibid. 
that Kashmir is a disputed issue and not an lnteorai part of 
India. 
A .join session of the Pakistan parliament adopted on 
Feb. 10, 1990, a resolution accusing India of repression in 
Kashmir and calling for a Plebiscite. The five point 
resolution . moved by foreign Minister Sahabzada Yakub Khan 
expressed "solidarity with the people of J ?< K in their 
struggle for self determination, called upon India to desist 
from its ruthless attempts to suppress the demand of the 
Kashmiris for self determination". 
It demand a final settlement of the J and K dispute 
through a fair and impartial plebiscite under the auspices 
on the UN and in accordance with the resolution of the 
security council and the directives of the UN commission for 
India and Pakistan . 
Apparently under domestic pressure, lis. Benazir 
Bhutto adopted a hawkish posture. She flatly reiterated 
that Pakistan would not compromise on the right of self-
determination of the People of Jammu and Kashmir. Besides, 
the instigations and encouragement by Pakistan there are 
several internal causes of the trouble in the valley. The 
state administration has been inefficient, ineffective and 
also corrupt w'. According to close observers of the 
64. The Times of India. 12th Feb. 1993. 
65. The Downhill slide - "Kashmir Behind the White 
Curtain". Khemlata Waklu on Wakhlu, pp. 340, 345. 
turmoil, the present impasses in Kashmir is largely the 
result of a series of ill conceived policies pursued by the 
central government and state administration. Political 
mismanagement and economic neglect are among the principal 
factors that led discontent and disillusionment. The 
interests of the people have been repeatedly disregarded 
with the result that their confidence in the democratic 
process has shaken. 
Since independence, Kashmir's economic development is 
not satisfactory because its share of national resources is 
inadeauate, so there is no industrial growth. Many 
important projects, sanctioned, a decade of or ago, either 
remain on paper or have been abandoned for want of funds. 
There has been shortage of drinking water and 
electricity despite the vast natural water and power 
resources. Education has spread, but there is inadequacy in 
employment to the educated youth. Besides. the tourism 
industry which has earned the country's substantial foreign 
exchange is still woefully backward. While Amritsar boasts 
of an international airport, Kashmir has none. These 
deficiencies, have enabled.certain vested interests. both 
within and outside the country, to exploit the situation. 
Besides, economic deficiency, the Islamic factor also 
has influenced Kashmiris in their auest for a separate 
identity. The "Shaheed" factor, and the canonization of 
Magbool But has been yet another motivating cause for young 
militant Kashmiri Muslim. 
MILITANT ORGANISATIONS : 
There are over 100 major and minor secessionist 
groups which have been in existence. Stance wise these can 
be divided into two broad groups, the protagonists of 
Kashmiriyat or independent Kashmir and the other who favour 
merger with Pakistan. The major groups favouring 
independent Kashmir are Jarnmu and Kashmir liberation Front 
(JKLF) which initially grew under the leadership of late 
MaqbDol Butt. Amanullah Khan. Hashim Oureshi. Kabir Sheikh. 
Abdul Wa.jid Wani and Yasin Malik. Allah Tigers, Student 
Liberation Front (now Pro-Pakistan Ikwan-ul-Muslimeen) . Al 
Fateh and Islamic Students League. 
The pro-Pakistan Secessionist organisations are Hizb 
- • '1 -'iu.iah ideen <HM) supreme commander Sayeed Salauddin, 
People league Chief Shabir Shah. Jammat-e-Islami Chief Syed 
Ali Shah Geelani. Jamiat-ul-Tulba Al-Umar-Mujahideen. The 
Hizbui Mujahideen is the most powerful. The Pakistan Inter 
Service Intelligence (ISI) have been supplying arms to the 
militants66. 
Hizbul Mu.jahideen has recently split into two groups 
into the pro and non-Jamat-e-Islami groups under Ashan Dar 
and Nasrul Islam. The main tussle seems to be for 
66. The Journal of the United Service Institutions of India 
(USD. Vol. CXXIV. No. 516. New Delhi. April - June 
1994, p. 142. 
leadership as is apparent by Shams-ul-Ha.Q. chief o-f Pro-
Jamiat faction calling the Amir and for dominance by Jamiat-
e-Islami. The major factions from the latest reckoning 
continue to be JKLF and Students Liberation Front favoring 
independence and Hizbul Mujahideen and the Peoples League 
having a Pro Pakistan stance. There is no overall direction 
or control of anyone from inside or outside, neither are 
their areas of influence or activity clearly demarcated. 
JKLF and Hizbul Mujahideen are the dominant factions and may-
be modulating the activities. Separatism is the popular 
concept common to both, the common meeting ground for a 
popular stance is secession from India. Along with this 
vocal agitation against the so-called government repression 
draws unqualified support from Kashmiri Muslims in all walks 
of life. 
SOME MAJOR INCIDENTS 
HAZRATBAL SHRINE : 
On Friday <Oct., 14, 1994) prayers over the faithful 
started streamingout when suddenly around 9.15 P.M. the 
Paramilitary Border Security Force \BSF) threw a tight 
cardon around the shrine. In Shrine an under mind number of 
devotees. including. women and children along with some 
armed militants were trapped inside . 
67. The Times of India, Oct. 24, 1993. 
The contradictory sionals from the main forces 
handling the seige-the army who have thrown an impregnable 
cardon around the Hazratbal Shrine. The state administration 
headed by the Governor K.V. Krishna Rao which handled the 
negotiations and the home ministry in New E>elhi overseeing 
the crisis-gave the militants hold up inside the shrine 
unnecessary leverage. The decision to provide food, 
restoration of the telephone line in the shrine which 
promptly used by the militants for Propaganda through 
interviews with the foreign media, and the conciliatory 
tone of the negotiations made it clear to the militants that 
they hold the higher hand c B. 
By the 14th day of the seige. Chief negotiator 
Wajahat Habibullah, under instructions, from the Government 
had more Dr less promised the militants safe passage. 
On October 15 Kashmiri IGP A.K. Sun was informed by 
a member Df the Muslim Auqaf Trust G.M. Chisti, that the 
militants inside the Shrine had tempered with the locks 
leading to the strong room in which the holy relic is kept. 
Suri called up Lt. Gen. M.A. Zaki. security adviser to the 
governor who immediately ordered' two BSF companies to 
surround the mosaue and block all e>;it and entry points 
before rushing to the Governor with news about the "Serious 
Development" . 
68. India Today. Nov. 15, 1993, p. 33. 
But just how serious was it at that stage ? It is. 
•for instance, no secret to the local police. the civil 
administration. the BSF the army and the intelligence 
aoencies that the militants had been using the Hazratbal 
Mosque as a hide-out for the past eight months. Five major 
groups JKLF, Al Jehad, Operation Balakote. Al-Umar and 
Hizbul Mujahideen had been holding arms displays inside the 
shrine including one just two days before the Siege. 
At this hour of crisis, when the decision to lay the 
seige was taken, the power centres within the Srinagar 
administration were regularly differing, on ways to handle 
the Hazratbal imbroglio Operation PsychD', meant to wear 
down the militants by denying them food and water, was 
handled by the administration while "Operation Flush Out" 
was the army option. 
The day after the siege began when the army took 
control of the areas around the shrine, it was decided in a 
meeting chaired by Zaki that the water and electricity 
supply to the mosaue be cut immediately. The army was clear 
in its objective-to secure the surrender of militants by 
making life difficult for them. Lt. Gen. Padmanabham 
declared. He was however, shocked to discover that even on 
the third day of the siege, neither the electricity nor the 
water supply to the mosaue had been disconnected. 
Habibullah again brought up the subject of providing 
food. His view was that the fight was against the 
militants, not the people who were trapped inside. The army 
strongly opposed the move for the simple reason that it 
would dilute the very purpose of the siege. The 
administrations agreed at a high level meeting to allow food 
to be given to atleast the civilians in the Shrine. Food 
was taken the next morning, Oct. 21. but the militants, 
refused to accept it saying they would not take anything 
that had been given by the government . 
Meanwhile around Hazratbal, the tension was mounting 
as Friday, Oct. 29, approached. The administration, fearing 
a fresh outbreak of protests, if the locals were denied 
performing namaz for the second successive week, apart from 
15 days of suffering under curfew, had set Fridav as the 
deadline for resolving the crisis. Maulana Abbas Ansari and 
Prof. Ghani, Hurriyat leaders, went into the shrine on 
Fridav evening to negotiate with the militants for a 
compromise solution. But by then which ever option was 
chosen. the Government had already lost the battle for 
Hasratbal. Lt. Gen. Padmanabham described it as a "no lose 
situation" for the army. "I do not see anv other solution 
but to stay here and secure the surrdner of these 
gentlemen", he said, adding that there were some too 
militants trapped within. 
69. The Times of India, Oct. 26, 1993. 
The state additional chief secretary (home;' hr. 
Mehmoodur-Rahman said that "the government would not capture 
or kill the militants inside the shrine though the 
administration could "Just -finish the entire drama within 20 
minutes." -'. It was this approach, exemplified by the iron 
first in the velvet glove, of Mr. Rahman which resulted in 
the successful resolution of the crisis. 
JAMMU REPUBLIC DAY PRADE : 
On 26 Jan 1995, the terrorist holded the shield bound 
security and blasted two powerful bombs by using remote 
control. On that occasion J and K Governor Mr. K.V. Krishna 
Rao was addressing the Republic Day function in which eight 
person were killed and Governor was escaped unhurt. 
A third blast occurred outside the main entrance to 
the Maul"--ia Azad Stadium. The blasts occurred in auick 
succession killing a black commando guarding the Governor 
two army Jawans. two police constables and two officials of 
the state information department. Fifty four persons were 
injured eight of them critically. The governors advisor 
B.K. Goswami and some other officials as well as state 
Janta Dal Chief Dhan Raj Bargotra were injured. Meanwhile 
the valley observed a complete bondh in response to a call 
by the All Parties Harriyat Conference (APHCr'1. 
70. The Times of India. Oct. 27. 1993. 
71. The Times of India. Jan 27, 1995. 
CHARAR-E-SHARIF : 
The mausoleum of Sheikh Noor Uddin Noorani, better 
known as Alamdar-e-Kashmir was built in the early 15th 
century by then rule of Kashmir Zain ul Abidin of Budshah 
(Great King) who was amonci the pall bearers of the revered 
saint. It was later rebuilt in 19th century during the 
pathan rule. The Shrine houses the graves of 11 sants apart 
from that of Sheikh Noor Uddin. In one of the graves rests 
the body of Lala Reshi, a Great Grandfather of the poet. 
Iqbal. The Shrine also housed a number Qf relics. one of 
them associated with Fatma. daughter of prophet Mohammad.. 
Informed sources estimated the number of militants 
holded up in the shrine to be approximately 70 of these 50 
were foreigners mostly Afghan and Pakistani nationals. The 
militants belonged to three different groups. About 30 (all 
ff fiQ, r' = and mostly Afghans) belonged to the Harkat ul 
Ansar, about 20 are from Pakistan and Pakistan occupied 
Kashmir led by Most Gul and the remaining 20, all Kashmiris 
belonged to the Hizbul Mu.iahideen. 
Mast Gul, a self styled 'major' who has been 
extensively interviewed by the local media, is a Pakistani 
national hailing from the North West Frontier Province who 
worked as an ISI agent during the Afghan war. Security 
agencies claim that he had masterminded the assassination of 
the Mirwair of South Kashmir, Qazi Nissar at Anantnag in 
June last year. This man is an ISI agent. Which country 
tolerates a foreign terrorists and agent operating so 
brazently on its soil is a point often raised by security-
officials in the valley. "These foreigners were not just 
terrorists, they were aggressors", point out a senior army 
officer on conditions of anonymity z. 
The historic Charai—e-Sharif shrine in north kashmir 
was burnt bv Pakistani trained mercenaries as 20 militants 
and two Armymen were killed in heavy fighting when troops 
moved into foil the mercenaries bid to escape after the act. 
Fighting was still raging in the town after troops were 
given the task of preventing the mercenaries from fleeing. 
In the fighting six security men had been injured, two of 
them seriously. 
A spokesman of Al-Faateh group. Issa styled himself 
as a general, claimed 32 militants were killed. He said of 
tnosr, l .' belonged to his force, seven tD Harkat-ul Ansar 
and five to Hisbul Mujahideen. 
The militants on the other hand, alleged that the 
army had advanced towards the shrine on 12 May night at 2.00 
p.m.and fired mortar shells tD set it fire and that even 
helicopters had been used for dropping incendiary materials. 
Along with the mausoleum and the hospice, hundreds of 
private houses in the Bulshanabad locality were also 
72. The Times of India. April 15. 1995. 
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reported to have been burnt down. Fire fighting operations 
were hampered by cross fire between the militants and the 
troops. This is the second incident of fire in the town in 
three days, the earlier blaze having destroyed at least 800 
houses and 200 shops . 
The separatist leader Shabir Shah addressed agitated 
crowds at a number of place along the Srinagar Charar-e-
Sharif road. At Wathora a magistrate and a SHO of the 
Police were injured in stone pelting by the mob. The 
biggest procession, 20,000 strong, was reported from 
Chadura. 
The strategy employed by the security agencies was to 
wear out the militants holed inside the shrine and the 
township located in this district. The hard option of 
launching a flush out operation in the shrine was completely 
ruled out/H. 
OPERATION SHANTI : (DODA CASE) 
Coordinated operations against the militants by the 
army and the Rashtnya Rifles have helped restore normalcy 
in the troubled Doda District. This welcome change came 
after a troubled period which witnessed a number of curfews, 
heavy casualties among security forces, looting and killing 
73. The Times of India, May 12, 1995. 
74. Ibid. 
102 
of the local population and the subsequent migration of a 
number of families to neighbouring Himachal Pradesh. 
The various operation launched by the army under the 
code name "Operation Shanti" had also exposed formidable 
militant outfits like the Harkutul-Ansar and Hizbul 
Mujahideen which had been dominating the upper hills of the 
Pir Panjal ranges,when the entire Doda district had been 
under the operational command of the Border Security Force. 
The situation deteriorated in the district after the 
migration of the local population from Bandoh and the 
subsequent communal riots in Kishtwar and Bhaderwah towns. 
which left three person dead. Worse, the communal riots 
created a sharp division among the two communities, who had 
been living together in harmony for centuries and had 
remained unaffected by the happenings in the Kashmir valley. 
Subsequently allegations of looting, extortion and human 
rights opuses against the BSF were made by the local 
population and some political and social outfits ""'. Sensing 
the seriousness of the situation, the centre deputed a team 
of Senior Home Ministry officials to visit Doda and assess 
the situation. This resulted in the deployment of 
additional units of the Army and Rashtriya rifles in the 
strike torn district. Things soon started changing with the 
militants. who earlier struck at will finding it difficult 
to face the "Flushing out and combing operations" launched 
by the army". 
75. Kalpana Rajaram. Current Events Spectrum. Spectrum 
India, New Delhi, 1994, p. 29. 
"Operation Shanti was launched as part of a three 
pronged strategy under which militants were cornered from 
the Ana.ntnacf district in the Kashmir Valley, which ad.iGins 
Doda and Sarthal in Jammu and from the lower hills of Doda. 
The militants found themselves in a hoDeless situation and 
were now on the run. 
Although the primary purpose of these happenings was 
not to inculcate terror in the public but to propagandize 
their cause internationally. What is significant in the 
armed conflict of Kashmir is that it was not mainly 
terrorism which was employed that those supporting the cause 
of independence. Conflict there is quasi - terrorist and 
Duasi guerrilla. In other words it is insurgency in the 
developing stage terrorism was employed whenever and 
wherever it was felt to necessary. What is to be said here 
is t'-,a,l violence in general is used as a political technique 
for political ends. 
K'4 
C - TERRORISM IN NORTH EAST REGION 
India'5 North Eastern fteoion. comprises of the "Seven 
Sisters" the states of Assam, Nagaland Manipur. Meghalaya. 
Tripura. Arunachal Pradesh and Hiroram. The region has a 
considerably large international boundary with China in the 
North Bangladesh in the South, Bhutan and Nepal in the West 
and Burma in the East. 
For decades the people in North East State had 
experienced political violence. cultural insecurity and 
economic deprivation, that was sporadic and confined to the 
Naga and Mizo. But it is the fear of losing their identity 
as an ethnic group due to demographic imbalance has become 
the major cause of trouble, that has crossed geographical 
barriers and engulf led even the perennial peace zone like 
Meghalava /c\ 
There have been as many as si>: insurgencies, the well 
known the Naga. revolt which continues at present and it has 
bases in Bagladesh and Mvanmar'' . The Mizo National Front 
which captured the main town of Mizo Hills Aizawal in 1966 
was another powerful movement. The United Liberation Front 
of Assam was a third as was the revolt by Tripura Volunteer 
Force. 
76. U.L.K. Sarin, India's North East in Flames.New Delhi 
I960, p. 12. 
77. Dangerous Developments, "Sunday Magazine". The 
Hindustan Times. New Delhi. 21 Aug. 1994. 
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Most of these movements such as in Mi scram and 
TriDura have abated or ended as a result of a combination of 
negotiation and Indian military force/G. In Manipur. the 
activities Df diverse insurgent groups operating mainly from 
the Imphal valley for the first time in 1994 came in the 
grip of ethnic clashes, rise of insurgency and political 
killings. Over 45000 security forces belonging to different 
army and para-military units were deployed throughout the 
state, but two years long Naga-Kuki clashes continued 
claiming more than 500 lives. 
The Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence <ISI) is 
very active in the North Eastern States and giving every 
assistance including training to insurgent groups there. 
G0C Eastern Command Lt. Sen. R.N. Batra, said that the ISI 





 o.n " ssam and PLA in Manipur as well as to certain 
79 
elements in lower Assam in some neighbouring countries . 
TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN MANIPUR : 
Manipur is a hill area. However the outburst of 
terrorism in the valley was mainly due to the follies and 
short sightedness of the Government of India, which looked 
at the problem solely from party political interests. In 
78. Ibid. 
79. "ISI Training Ultras in North East", The Hindustan 
Times. New Delhi. 18 December, 1994. 
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early 1980= Mara pur. bordering Burma both in the South and 
in the East, was the most disturbed state in India. After 
dark Imphal. its capital, looked as deserted city owing to 
curfew, and in day-times it looked like an occupied 
territory. The area of North-Burma, adjacent to Nagaland 
and Manipur, is practically out of control of the Burmese 
Government and is infested by rebels, aided and abetted by 
China. There is link between the Chinese, the Burmese 
rebels and the Peoples Liberation Army in Manipur. 
Indian Government itself created a fertile ground for 
anti national force with practically the largest per capita 
input of central funds. Manipur s per capita income was 
only about three fourth of the national average. Out of the 
state budget of about 80 percent comes from the Centre. The 
combination of corrupt politicians, corrupt bureaucrates and 
contractors siphoned out about 70 per cent of the funds 
sanctioned for development. At 10 percent cut each by a 
number of persons occasionally starting from the chief 
Minister himself had been the norm in Manipur. 
Even repeated presidential rule had no effect because 
of continued political motivation of the administration. 
The scale DT corruption in Manipur was unbelievable, every 
appointment, transfer and posting has a. price-tag. Many-
ministers had a large incomes from smuggling across the 
Burma border. Manipur was full of smuggled goods ranging 
from electronics to low cost fabrics. 
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Out of total population about 60 per cent of the 
population of Manipur (16 Lakhs in 19B5). consisting of 
Meities of the valley. almost forced their reluctant 
Mahara.ja to accede to the Indian Union in 1949. They called 
themselves Hindus. It is these people whom we have 
alienated. In the chanced political atmosphere the 
congress*I) chief Minister Ra.iku.mar E>orendra Singh, had the 
audacity to make a non-sensical statement that Metities were 
forcibly converted to Hinduism about two and half centuries 
back. However the slogan "back to Sanamahi" - Meiti faith 
over 250 years back and recall of the Mongolian past was 
merely an angry reaction and not the heart felt desire of 
the people. 
There are 29 schedule tribes in this area of which 
the majority are Nagas and Kukis. forming about 32 per cent 
of the population. These tribes got the concessions given 
to them by the constitution and a good number of these got 
into IAS. IPS and other Central Services. The Meitis were 
not given army favour with the result their representation 
in the higher services is very poor. 
MEITI TERROR : 
The Meiti terrorism had its roots in 1964 but it 
started in a mild way in 1978 and become Quite bad bv 1980. 
The fear of killings was so great that after dusk the city 
of Imphal used to turn into a ghost city and no one moved 
out except the security forces, especially the CRPF and the 
iOS 
hanipur Rifles. There were several asDectE of terrorism 
looting of banks and killing non-Manicuris and raiding 
police stations, but their main objective was to kill 
policemen. especially CRPF. When CRFF captured the PREPAK 
chief R.K. Tulachandra Singh, with a reward of Rs. 50.000 on 
his head, he not only escaped from the custody of the local 
Police but took a constable of Manipur Rifles with him8'-*. 
When terrorism become fairly bad the Government of 
India passed the armed forces (Assam and Hanipur) special 
power act of 1958. Section 3 of Act empowers the government 
to declare any area as 'disturbed area' by a notification. 
This Dives special powers to the armed forces and para-
military forces. In August 1979 a number of incidents took 
place in which a police station was raided and several 
policemen were killed or injured. On September 22, police 
station. Moirano, was attacked, five Policemen killed and 16 
rifles of the Police Station along with ammunition was 
stolen. By notification on October 26, 1979 Government 
declared a number of terrorist bodies as unlawful the 
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). Red Army \RA) , Revolutionary 
People's Front and People (RF'FP). Revolutionary Party of 
Kangleipak (PREPAK) hardly changed the situation. The PLA 
got an able cadre Bisheswar. who had training in China. The 
main target of PLA had been in security forces0 
80. Iboyaima Laithangbam "Strong Insurgency Under Currents 
in Manipur" in The Sentinel. Vol. 5. No. 221, 24 Nov.. 
1987. p. 3. 
Bl. Ibid. 
The success of the anti-Indian Propaganda was seen in 
the anti-Mayang <anti-foreigner) riots on April 28. 1980 
when violent mobs burnt down hundreds of huts and scores of 
motor vehicles and forces many outsides to flee for their 
lives. This was another shock to the Government because 
Meitis are by nature quite. peaceful. friendly and 
hospitable people and such terroristic acts were hardly 
expected from them. This shows the disgraceful extent to 
which a corrupt administration had increased the economic 
misery in Imohal and forced young men to extremes. The 
situation in Manipur deteriorated fast in 1982 when the 
insurgents in the hills revived their terrorism. In early 
March 1984 the terrorists killed over a dozen people, 
including three children, in Imphal. In February 1982. 22 
.iawans were killed at Nathilok in Ukhrul district. An 
abortive attempt was made on the life of the lianipur chief 
Mir^i+er Mr. Rishding keishing. on December 8, 1983. 
Keishing escaped unhurt but three Manipur Rifles personnel 
escorting him, were killed. On February 18. 1985 thirteen 
Army men and two civilians were killed in an ambush by 
National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). The 
assailant. led by T. Muivah opened fire with automatic 
weapons from both sides of the road, killing all security 
men in the army convoy. The rebels snatched all the weapons 
including one light machine gun. 11 rifles and three 
carbines besides ammunition. These are reasons to believe 
that USA and China have some plans of creatino a separate 
!lu 
countrv in the North East . 
NAGA KUKI CLASH : 
The Naga Kuki Clashes are due to some different 
reason : one is the political linkage of both the two croups 
with the political parties, who give direct and indirect 
support to these groups. Another is the domination of Naga 
majority over to Kuki minority, Nagas of Manipur want to 
create a greater Nagaland with the combination of four 
districts of Manipur which is not acceptable for kukis of 
Chandel District of Manipur. Another main cause in the 
collection of illegal money tax by the NSCN with the Kukis 
are responsible factors of ethnic conflict between the Naoas 
& Kukis. 
As insurgency problems is concerned. Manipur. in the 
; ,;.u. cency history of the region faced for the first time in 
1994. when armed Naga underground men ambushed and killed 29 
security personnel al Yangkhullan areB. in the states 
5enapati district bordering Nagaland . 
While the National Socialist Council of Nagaland is 
active in hill districts particularly in Chandel and Ukhrul. 
the United Nations. Liberation Front (UNLF) the oldest and 
well organised underground outfit in Manipur has become 
agile both in the hills and valley in the state. 
82. Ibid. 
83. "94 - A Year of Insurgency for Manipur". The Hindustan 
Times. 6 June 1985. 
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Other underground organiration like People s 
Liberation Army, Kuki Defence Force, People's Revolutionary 
Party of Kangleipak, Kuki National Army and other two 
stepped up their activities84. 
TERRORISM IN TRIPURA s 
TriDura is the second smallest state in the Indian 
Union, the Bengali refugees had started coming to Tripura in 
1939 after vicious communal riots in Dhaka. They were 
welcomed with open arms by Maharaja, who gave them forest 
lands to reclaim and settle down. This state was mainly 
tribal state but continuous influx of refugees has changed 
its character so much that in 1985 out of total population 
of 23 lakhs the tribais would not number more than 6 lakhs. 
This transformation in the ethnic composition of the 
population is the root cause of all political agitation 
ltdoinci to terrorism. The massive influx made nonsense of 
all laws enacted to save tribal lands from falling into the 
hands of non-tribals. Inquiries showed that about 80 
percent of lands in the hands of non-tribals had been 
obtained by force. This small state has to resources to 
provide gainful employment to 23 lakhs of people and the 
massive influx has led to higher prices for land. increase 
in unemployments and consequent frustration for youth an 
ideal atmosphere for the growth of IMaxalism and terror. 
84. Ibid. 
ill: 
The unhappy tribals soon found a militant 
organization. which demanded restoration of lands. taken 
away by non-tribals. These demands first formulated in 1967 
when the Tripura Upjati Juba Samiti iTUJS) was formed. 
Terrorisms was the last painful response of tribal, who got 
no .justice from the congress and not adeauate justice from 
C.P. (M)85. 
DEATH AND DEVASTATION IN EARLY JUNE 1980 : 
A wide spread terror, which swept TriDura in the 
first fortnight of June 1980. left death and devastation all 
around and Tripura has never been the same since then. The 
tribal youth did not have enough education and knowledge of 
world politics to understand. In their emotional response 
they thought that tribals would again rule Tripura. These 
innocent feeling of the tribals and the deeo anti-non 
tribals hysteria, whipped up by the TUJS Was taken advantage 
bv anti-Indian elements in India and outside to incite 
massacres, whose follow is still not over. The anti-Indian 
inspiration came from Bangladesh. where the guerrilla 
warfare section of the TUJS went for training and supply of 
arms. 
The TUJS had got hold of the emotional foreigner s 
issue to keen up the militancy of their youth supporters. 
To arose hatred against non tribals the TUJS gave a call for 
65. The Sunday Sentinel <6uwahati>. Vol. 4, No. 37. 26 
December. 1986. p. 1. 
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bazar boycott for a week -from June 1. 1980. The TUJ5 
extremists had started attacking non-tribals. Between may 
29 and June 5 at least 12 non-tribals were killed. 
The Dower keg an Tripura was ready for a fuse while 
the intel1igence authorities both in Delhi and Agartala were 
in blissful ignorance. On June 6. 1980 when there was a 
auarrel between Bengali Shopkeeper and two Tribals 
communities were present it soon look the shape DT" a clash. 
The fact that violence soon overwhelmed the western and 
southern parts of Tripura shows pre-planning. Mandari 
Bazar, only 35 km from Agartala. was the worst affected and 
here over 300 Bengalis were but chered under a pre-meditated 
and planned strategy. These massacres continued unchecked 
for 3 days more and perhaps over a thousand Bengalis were 
killed. The Bengalis were not unprepared and Quite soon they 
-' + " e^d revenge against the tribals. what happend was not an 
insurgency: it was not a tribal uprising, it was a terrorism 
pure and simple first to frighten the Bengalis and then to 
frighten the tribals. It was the worst failure of law and 
order till then after independence. Any way in Tripura the 
main object of the terrorists was achieved. namely. their 
campaign of hatred succeed and complete polarization was 
affected between tribals and non-tribals. 
TERROR CONTINUES IN 1985-86 : 
The C.P.<M> Chief Minister, Mr. Nripen Chakravartv. 
is to be given creoit for doing /justice to the tribals 
1.14 
thouph it affected the C.P <M.''s Bengali base, he not on i v 
enacted the land Restoration Act but got it implemented 
against the wishes of the Bengali speaking bureaucracy. The 
improvements effected recently have not ended terrorism of 
the TLLTS. whose main targets for massacre become C.P. <M> 
party members. In 1984 union {government setup a high level 
team, under a. major general, to evolve a plan for fighting 
tribal terrorism. This plan visualized a much preater 
presence of CRPF battalions but it conceded Mr. Nripen 
Chakravarty's main point that Disturbed Areas Act. Diving 
sweeping powers to the armed forces, need not be applied and 
that the situation should be controlled by para-mi 1itarv 
forces. In 1983 there were about 50 clashes between the 
security forces and the terrorists and about 30 persons were 
killed. The number of clashes increased in 1984 and about 
50 persons were killed. The present threat comes mainly 
from the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) led bv Mr. Bijoy 
Hirankhal, which has been spreading chaos since he took 
control of that bodv in 1982. In early April 1985 there was 
an ambush at Saikaria in Tripura. which claimed 6 lives of 
the security forces. The 'hit list of the terrorists is 
said to contain about 50 names, the prominent one being the 
Dv. Chief Minister. Mr. Basarath Beb. who has given his life 
to tribal welfare. This proves that the present ob.iect of 
the terrorists is not to help tribals but ant l-nat iona.1 
forces, getting inspiration from Dutside India. 
On 10th March 1986 armed TNV extremists gunned down 
four persons and burnt down several shoos at Dataram in the 
south district of Triour?. 
On April 5. 1986 TNV guerrillas shot dead five people 
and critically wounded 6 at Kurma Bazar. The guerrilla 
raided the village market and fired in discriminated from 
sophisticated weapons . 
There is no dDubt that in May 1985 there was a sense 
of insecurity in large parts of Tripura due to terrorism 
practiced by TNV. According to statistics available to the 
press for the period 1984-85 (upto April 5) there were 5 
cases of ambushing security personnel and 61 Dther incidents 
in march 146 and 31 members of security forces were killed. 
What is worse the terrorists are collecting levies regularly 
in some areas from government servants, contractors. 
traders, etc. All this represent a high level of 
terrorism. 
The increased violence by the Tribal National 
Volunteers is a crude wav of impressing upon the centre the 
need to negotiate with TNV leaders as it has been 
negotiating with them Misoram National Front <MNF). Though 
their means are deplorable their claims seems to be 
legitimate. There has been a close relationship between the 
strategy and activities of the TNV and the MNF66. 
86. The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, April 6. 1986. 
87. Heneray Jacob "So Much For So Little'', Sunday 
(Calcutta). Vol. 15. No. 39, 28 August -3 September 
19B8. p. 15. 
88. Ibid. 
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The main reasons why the centre is not inclined to 
negotiate with the TNV is its record of violence. In recent 
months the TNV men have attacked at several villages thev 
have been playing a game of hide and seek with security 
forces. After committing gruesome crimes, they take shelter 
across the border in Bangladesh. 
The TNV needs to be tackled in different ways. The 
violent elements should be sternly dealt with but too mucn 
of force on the Dart of government can prove to be 
unproductive. A solution to the problem of insurgency is 
possible only through a negotiated settlement with TNV. A 
better deal for tribals, however, is the ultimate answer to 
the unrest in the Border State. 
TERRORISM IN MIZORAM : 
In the vear 1959 the terrible famine shocked the 
mi 20s. It was notorious 'Mautum - cyclic famine caused bv 
flowering of bamboo leaves. The relief organised by the 
Government was inefficient and it was then that Laldenga 
become a leader of Mizos by organising the distribution of 
food. An ambitious man, Laldenoa saw the resentment in eves 
of Miros and converted his famine relief body into the Mizo 
National Front (MNF) which was the main headache to the 
government of India. It was a rival source of Dower because 
often the people Daid more taxes to the MNF than to the 
89 government 
89. V.k. Nayar. Threat From Within.Lancer Publishers. 
New Delhi. 1992, D. 191 
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Lalaenga succeeded in firing the imagination of MIZOE 
with the idea of an independence nation. In 1966 the MNF 
captured vital points and started terror against non-Mizos. 
many of them were killed. The ignorance of Government was 
immense. It was treated as a purely law and order problem. 
The army moved in a bio way, the rebellion was suppressed 
but the manner in which the army solved the problem left 
deep fears on the Mizo Psyche. The proup village system 
disrupted the life of the Mizo and increased their hatred 
for India. 
Terrorism reached new heights after 1974 when all 
non-Mizos were asked to leave Mizoram and a large number 
were killed. As a result of this terror as manv as ten 
thousands non-Mizos left Mizoram after closing their 
business. This was a visible demonstration of their power 
lay in Mizoram. Very soon in January 1975 came the murder 
Df 3 senior Police officers-while they were sitting, in their 
office. Vigorous anti-terrorist measures were always foiled 
by MNF s reauest for a cease-fire while Government of India 
hoped for a peaceful end to the problem. the period was 
usually by the underground for regrouping and re-arming till 
there was another about of terrorism. Thus in March 1980 as 
manv as 25 people were murdered and the situation was so bad 
that neither the Lt. Governor nor the Chief secretary moved 
outsiae their houses 
90. Ibid. 
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BASIC FACTORS FOR OVER FAILURE : 
The most distressing factor has been our own 
ignorance. The Power base in Delhi depends uoon the votes 
of the Hindi speaking states and the politicians had at no 
time through about a distant and isolated part of India 
like Mizoram until the rebellion in 1966. The ignorance of 
the political executive percolated to the senior ranks of 
the bureaucracy. till 1970 quite a few confused between 
Nagaland and Mizoram. Even in 1980 Laldenga complained that 
the tele-communication authorities did not know where 
Aizawal was. There is no doubt that one pood result of 
constant terrorism in Mizoram is to invite the attention of 
the Government of India to this region. 
In contrast to Indian ignorance Laldenga told Jyoti 
Ja.Ta that when he took the first batch of Mizo boys to China 
for training the Chinese both men and women who met him 
spoke Mizo, sang Mizo Songs and gave them Mizo food to eat. 
This did not prove that the Chinese, as a whole undei—stood 
Mizoram but it did show that the Chinese leadership had 
trained at least a small band of Mizoram specialists. This 
brings us to the factor in sustainintj terrorism nameiv 
Chinese inspirations. After the open Sino - Soviet split in 
1969 China renewed its efforts in creatine unrest in the 
North-East in border to weaken India. When Bangladesh 
became hostile to India after the murder of Sheikh Mu.nbur 
Rahman it acted after 19 as a safe sanctuary for Mizo 
terrorists who received arms, training and moral support. 
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A sea changed has come after the assassination of 
Mrs. Gandhi and the election in Mizoram. Through enormous 
monev resources and by a secret alliance with Laldanga and 
his MNF the Congress (I) secured a majority and 
Laithanahawal became the congress<I> Chief Minister. His 
inclinations were oroved by the fact that one of his first 
announcement was that he was willing to step down in favour 
of Laldenga. In the elections the taped speeches of 
Laldenga were used by Congress (I). It is mterestino to 
watch how terrorism now fares in Mizoram. When the 
Congress*I) government itself is supported by MNF. The 
people. after nearly two decades of chaos and terrorism, 
genuinely want peace. 
With the best efforts made by then Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi and MNF leader Laldenga the 10 year old attempt 
ax an accord finally succeeded when both parties realized 
that thev did not have too many bargainino Chios and needed 
each other, under the agreement, he would share Dower with 
Congress(I> with him as the chief minister. 
But the most important issue that needs to be sorted 
out is the surrender of rebels and their arms. There have 
been accords in other places such as Punjab and Assam but 
the problem remained. There is no Guarantee that all the 
armed insurgents about 500 in Bangladesh and 100 in Burma 
will surrender alono with their arms. The Question is 
whether laldenga enjoys a complete following of under ground 
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elements to secure1 the surrender of all rebels, some doubt 
that he does. Laldenos is now emphatic, that he will succeed 
in his mission. 
TERRORISM IN ASSAM : 
Assam is bounded by Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh in 
the North. Arunachal Pradesh. Nagaland and Mamour in the 
East. Tripura. Bangladesh and Meghalaya in the South and 
West Bengal in the West. It provides access to Bhutan and 
Bangladesh and the state of the North-East which were part 
of Assam earlier. All these areas are highly prone to 
infiltration by Bangladeshis and to some extent bv the 
people of Nepal through West Bengal and Bhutan. In addition 
there has been infiltration of cheap Bihari Labour into 
Assam like any where else in India. 
All these things created security threat for Assam 
from China. Mynamar and Bangladesh. The threat from 
Banoladesh directly is nominal, but threat to internal 
security is mainfild due to the presence of large number of 
immigrants from that area which is still continuing. It 
created fear among the real inhabitants for their 
deprivation. So the real problem of Assam was related to 
foreign nationals. settled in Assam during the post 
partition period. So basic demand of the Assamese were that 
all foreigners must be departed to their country and their 
names must be removed from the electoral roll. The 
international borders alono Assam must be sealed to check 
m f : ltrfti o-.. 
Ana Government must issue identity CB.raz. to Inaian 
voters in Assam. Ail Assam Students Union <AASLO and Assam 
Sana Sanoram Prishad (AGSP) gave aoitational shape to these 
demands by which the whole administration was paralyzed. 
Their target was to distrupt the movement of oil as well as 
law and order situation. In view of the serious nature of 
agitation the central government made efforts to come to 
some sort of settlement with the agitation leaders. Despite 
all the efforts no agreement could be arrived on 
identification and deportation of foreign national in Assam. 
The A6P Ministry of Mahanta could not deal with the 
problems of foreigners effectively. The Centre also found 
it difficult to detect and disenfranchise thousands of 
foreigners. The sealino of the Assam-Bangle border was also 
a difficult task. These factors damaged the credibility of 
the AGP government and the failure of the Assam Accord 
created another serious problems of militancy. The two 
militant organization. the United Liberation Front of Assam 
vULFA) and Assam Bodo Student Union (ABSU) came to 
existence. 
ULFA : 
It was formed in 1979 at Sibsagar by fta.-jiv Ra.ikhowa. 
F'arsh Baruuo. Pradeep Gonpoi. and Gulab Baruo for Swadhin 
Asom vlndependent Asom State). The ULFA is essentially an 
off- shoot of the Assam agitation and many of its member 
11-2 
O 1 
once belonged to the All Assam Students Union • A Since 19b6 
this extremist outfit operating in Assam has induloed in all 
sorts of terrorists activities viz.. bomb explosions. 
Kidnaping killings, robbery, extortion at large scale, which 
ruined the economy of the state and made a mockey of the 
state. During December 1986 it was resorted that the Army 
arrested two Assamese extremists Prabhat Nath and Panka.i 
Kumar in Mon District Df Nagaland in the extreme North-East. 
Bordering Burma. Official sources stated that they were on 
their wav to the headauarters of the NSCN in Burma. A letter 
written by Pravesh Barua. Self-styled "Commander in Chief" 
of ULFA held it responsible for the killings in Assam during 
the year. The two arrested ULFA men are reported to have 
told the army that there were about five hundred Assamese 
extremists who had already undergone training in guerrilla 
war fare at the headauarters"". 
ULFA after lying low for more than one year struck 
again with its terrorist activities beginnino in Julv 1986. 
It was reported that during July. 1988, 20 extremists 
returned after a training stint in guerrilla warfare in 
Burma. The Police were not left in any doubt about their 
intentions. Within a week three persons at Dulia.ian. Namruo 
and Nalbari were killed by ULFA and the police suspect its 
activities, involvement in the bomb blasts at Baroeta Road 
91. Radhika Ramesan "Holding the AGP to Ransom. The Sunday 
\Calcutta) Vol. 15, No. 33. 17-23, July, 1987. p. 52. 
92. The Sentinel, 12 December. 1986. 
which claimed more than eight lives'"'. With 5 spat of 
agitations and bandhs. toqether with the terrorism unleashed 
by ULFA. Assam is confronted with uncertainly and 
insecurity. 
The centre Government had no other option but to 
deploy the army for flushing out members of the ULFA. The 
"Operation Ba.irang" launched to flush out the military from 
the area, but it could not fully establish control in the 
area. Subseouently elections were held in June 1991 and a 
new congress(I) Government headed by Hiteshwar Saikia 
assumed office. By then the ULFA had become very active, 
they killed two hostages-Ra.iu. an ONGC engineer and Bipul 
Mahanta. The army was again called to assist the state 
government and "Operation Rhino" was launched, it was also 
accompanied by a massive public relations drive so that the 
local population could be won over thereby makinp thing 
smooth for the army. In December 1991 the ULFA announced 
for an unconditional and unilateral cease-fire. To tackle 
insurgency the army carried out Operations Bajranq and 
'Rhino . in which a number of divisions were used to break 
ULFA networks on the ground. An important improvement 
during Rhino was better intelligence. improved civil 
militarv interface and overall command and control. with 
94 greater stress on Psychological warfare operations . 
93. Ramesan. No. 72. pp. 52. 53. 
94. Lt. Gen. V.K. Sood."Insurgency in the North East has 
the Army Delivered. Afsir karim (ed.) Indian Defence 
Review. Lancer International. New Delhi. Oct. 1992. p. 
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The other major groups the Assam government has 
managed to alienate is the state's Bengali (Muslim and 
Hindu) population. Championing this disgurantled section is 
the United Minorities Front \'UMF) formed by Golan Usmani, 
before the 1985 Assembly elections. Similarly. in the 
southern districts of Cachar and Karimgan.). the dominant 
Bengali population is eaually incensed with the AGF "Given 
these Schism. and the fact that majority of the Assamese 
leadership resents its inability to depart large sections of 
suspected Bangladeshi infiltrators, instability in Assam 
politics is inevitable" "" 
ALL BODO STUDENTS UNION : 
The Bodes are the major tribal group in Assam who are 
demanding a separate state for the Bodos. The Bodos country 
Starts right from the western Assam and ends at Sadiya in 
the extreme north eastern Assam. According to Uoendra Nath 
Brahma. President of ABSU. which is in the forefront of the 
movement for the separate state "If all our land passes into 
the hands of the non-tribals where would the Bodos go", asks 
9t Brahma '. The Fresident of the All Assam Tribal Students 
Union ftano.i Kumar Pegu states " the tribal people of Assam 
are being compelled to take the agitational path in view of 
the mountino Government sponsored anti-tribal activities in 
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the state". Commenting on the spate of bandh calls given by 
his organiuation. he said that these were primarily in 
protest against the continuing eviction notices in the 
97 tribal belts of Assam. 
ABSU started its agitation because of socio-economic 
backwardness, feeling of insecurity due to long oppression 
and deprivation, non implementation of tribal welfare 
programme etc. 
They launched their movement in March 1987, since 
then they have been holding rallies, bandhs and indulged in 
violence arson, bomb blasts, blowing up of road vehicles and 
railway bridges. vehicles and derailment of trains. In 
1988, ABSU renewed the agitation under Upendra Bhrama and 
demanded a fifty-fiftv division of Assam but the state 
government rejected demand of division of Assam. Violence 
took the deadly shape in which hundreds of people lost their 
1ives. 
Violence was soarked-off by the alleged rape of nine 
women by the Assam police. In the violence 20 peoples were 
killed either by Bodo militants or Police and 500 ABSU 
activists were arrested. The agitation was renewed in March 
1989 in which 30 people were killed and 100 injured. The 
station Master of Sesaoani in hokra.ihar was killed and a 
97. The Sentinel. 10 June 1987. 
train blowup. In July, the Assam Government decided to 
conduct all business in Kokra.ihar and Nalbari Districts and 
Udalqiri Subdivisions of Darang District in the Bodo 
language. The trouble started by the killing of a Non-Bodo 
by suspected Bodo extremists. 13 villages in lakhimpur and 
33 villages in Sum tour District were affected, nine people 
were killed and over 25.000 were rendered homeless . 
Violence was continued and in April 1990. Bodo 
extremists fixed target to blow Police vehicle. They also 
brought down the Manas Bridge servering Assam s link with 
the rest of the country. They derailed two passenger 
trains. In 1 May 1990 the death of Llpendra Bhrama. leader 
of Bodos. was a great setback to Bodos militants. However, 
they continued their activities. In June they killed the 
Health Officer in kokrajhar District, blew up a bus near 
Barpeta killing 12 and injured 35- During the period March 
1988 to April 1990. 300 people including 35 Government 
servants are alleged to have been killed in the area. 
Now. both the government and Bodos militants after-
blowing hot and cold arm in the process of reassessing the 
situation. Recently on 20 February. 1993 the six year old 
Bodo ethnic issue was settled, with the signing of an accord 
on the creation of a Bodoland Autonomous council with 
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The north eastern region of India. consisting of 
'seven sisters'. has long been a conflicting prone area. 
This region is heterogeneous full of so many complexities, 
and problems that has caused troubles in the region. 
Various groups have fought in this region for different 
political purposes, using violence as a means. Terrorism 
remained one of the means available to the people of the 
region. They used it among themselves (one ethnic group 
against another) and also against the governments as a means 
for satisfying their political objectives. 
In post-independence India violence manifested itself 
in various forms. Violence as a political technique for 
political purposes has also been employed by various ethnic 
and disintegrative forces deliberately, consciously thinking 
that this could be a vehicle for meeting out their political 
ends. Terrorism is one of the ways py which various groups 
carried out violence sometimes against the Indian state, and 
sometimes against state governments. Terrorism has been 
chosen as an easy way of fighting which proves costly for 
the enemy and beneficial for the practitioners of terrorism. 
It proves costly for the enemy as it creates serious 
security problems, disrupts the generally accepted norms and 
standards of decency, necessary for smooth functioning for a 
society. It attacks the very mechanism through which nation 
exercises its control over the society. Terrorism whether 
achieve the political aims are not but the violence 
perpetrated by it has made us shudder with a creeping sense 
i_:3 
of insecurity. In a relatively brief snan of time terrorism 
degrades the quality of life for inhabitant Df the nation. 
The enormous burden on the finance of the nation already 
over stretched to meet the increasing cost of security 
causes damaging blow to the welfare and economic advancement 
of the society. It creates a climate of bitterness and 
hatred poisons the relations between different ethnic groups 
by indicating the whole generation into the ethos of 
violence. Terrorism has been employed by Naxaiite. Sikh 
terrorist various militant groups of North-Eastern region 
and even by Kashmiri militants. The Post independence 
history of terrorism in India is that it has been a 
consciously chosen way of fighting for those who had/have 
disparity and ineaualibrium in military capabilities with 
the enemy against whom the violence was supposed to be 
launched. 
The terrorist in post independence India carried out 
violence by means of extortion, looting, bombing, explosion, 
assassination. Hijacking, abduction, indiscriminate killing 
and whenever they found any other tactics to be more 
effective they employed, that terrorism some times was also 
used in-con.iunction with other forms of other warfare like 
guerrilla and insurgency, particularly in North Eastern 
Reoion of India. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
C O N C L U S I O N S 
The world is rocked bv terrorism. Governments, 
politicians and others daily announce Dlans and strategies 
but terrorism flourishes and grows. The truth is that there 
can be no effective cure without sound diagnosis. We must 
understand and define terrorism and examine from whence it 
springs. The phenonmenon of terrorism can be defined as a 
strategy whereby violence is used to produce certain effects 
on an individual or in a group of peoDle so as to attain 
some political ends. One of the effects of such a strategy 
Is often fear. However, there can be. and usually are other 
effects. 
Both states seeking to maintain power and non-state 
actors trying to attain power can resort to the strategy of 
terrorism. In the contemporary world. where terrorist 
strategies are usually linked to non-state actors, it is 
often forgotten that the origin of this political term was 
the state terror of the so-called Reign of Terror in 1793-94 
during the French Revolution. In the particular stage of 
the French Revolution. Robespierre and the Committee on 
Public Safetv executed thousands of members who had opposed 
the revolution. The term has also been aDDlied in the case 
of the great terror of Joseph Stalin from 1936 to 1938. A 
government that resorts to terrorism, the wav RobesDierre 
and Stalin did. has one basic purpose : to intimidate those 
who offer anv opposition to their policies. 
This conceDt of terrorism, makes it a method of 
combat in the struggle between social grouos and forces, 
rather than a struggle between individuals. The victims 
stand as "reDresentatives of social orouos or of systems of 
government". The publicity value of terrorists is the 
central point in the strategy of terrorism. The reigning 
government and the masses of the population are being given 
notice that "constituted authority is no longer safety 
entrenched and unchallenged". 
Since governments are not inclined tD retreat before 
acts of terror directed at individuals, terrorism has never 
attained real success as a complete revolutionary tactics. 
It must be noted that onlv the democratic countries 
provide the liberal atmosphere and the rule of law which, 
paradoxically, enable the terrorists to survive and operate. 
Yet. the terrorists, and their supporters scream "foul" when 
their legal rights are infringed by the authorities. 
Same has been the case of India which has been 
overtaken bv terrorism both inside and outside the country. 
India has been unprepared for such an eventuallv with an 
atmosphere of freedom and relaxation. It is under this 
context that a Prime Ministe of the country, diplomats and 
even ordinary people have been killed. The counry remains 
in a complete shock and day to day life is full of fear and 
insecurity. 
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During the colonial period startinp with the British 
rule in 1B56. there were two main types of extremist 
policies, one was of the nationalist typology and the other 
ideological or communist tvpology. The nationalist 
extremism started earlier almost from the beginning of the 
present century and ended earlier also with the achievement 
of independent. 
The communists extremism started towards late 
twenties and continued bevonp the colonial rule and is still 
continuing in the form of sporadic terrorism by Naxalities. 
At present. India, is facing around ten well defined 
terrorist organizations besides the 25 Naxalite oroups. 
Maoist type of urban and rural guerrillas operating 
practically independent Df each other in every province 
specially Kerala. Tamil Nadu. Andhra Pradesh Bihar. West 
Bengal Tripura, and Punjab with roots going into Pakistan. 
Nepal. Bangladesh and even Srilanka. 
In the north eastern India, almost every state can 
boast of at least one terrorist setup. In Nagaland and 
Mizoram, the Naga National Council and the Nation 
Socialistic Council of Nagaland <NSCN). and Mizo National 
Front (MNF) have been at the forefront Df Terrorism since 
1955. 19B0 and 19B6 respectivelv. The PeoDles Liberation 
Army (FLA) and Peoples Revolutionary Party <PREPAK), in 
Manipur. the Tripura Upjati Juba Samity (TUJS) army of 
Tripura "Liberation Organisation <ATPLO), and the Tripura 
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National Volunteers (TNV) in Tripura. and the two Khasi and 
Jaintia Liberation Armv (KJLA) and the Public Demands 
Implementation Convention (PDIC) in Meghalaya. have recentlv 
started indulging in terrorism. Some of the other terrorist 
organization also in Uttra Khand, Jharkhand, Darjeeling. 
Vidarbha, and other regions have been demonstrating 
increasing reliance on violence and bloodshed. The 
terrorism let loose by the fanatic do or die eauals of 
Punjab almost shatterred our national fabric. During the 
"Dharm Yudh" (Holv War) for the Punjabi Khalistan. numerous 
murder. bomb explosions, and train derailment were common. 
HaryanDeshni. an organisation emerged almost overnight in 
the state of Haryana. And in Jammu and Kashmir, the Jammu 
and Kashmir Liberation Front <JKLF). The Kashmir liberation 
Armv (KLP>. were doing great loss to men. materials, 
resources and the nation. 
The majority of those individuals involved in the 
terrorist activities as cadre or leaders were well educated. 
The leaders of different terrorist, group, in India, such as 
Babbar Khalsa and All India Sikh Student Federation <AISSF) 
of Punjab. Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) of 
Darjeeling area. the People's War Group (PWG) of Andhra 
Pradesh or Naxalite groups, and some of the Kashmiri 
militants are highly qualified and from different 
professional institutions. 
Indian democracy, since last forty years, has faced 
manv terrorist challenaes out of which the Naxalite and 
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Punjab terrorism has been paramount. 
In the historv of terrorism in the modern Indian 
state the kidnapping and release of Ms. Rubaiva Saveed. 
daughter of the then Indian Home Minister. Mufti Mohammad 
Sayeed. in 1990. was a turning point. The National Front 
Government's inept handling of the episode with no viable 
policy in evidence and its eagerness to secure her release 
at any cost was a clear sign to terrorist groups in Kashmir 
and other parts of India such as Punjab. Assam and Andhra. 
Each episode was accompanied by its share of media hype and 
hvsteria. However, the common thread in all these incidents 
to an informed observer was a far more disconcertino fact 
i.e. the utter lack of direction and policy within the 
Sovernment of India while dealing with a hostage situation. 
Why this should be so is a pointer to the ad hoc 
nature of decision makino in the Home Ministrv of the 
Government of India, for there is no dearth of studies and 
experiences available in the world on dealing with hostage 
taking with some excellent work having been done in USA. 
Germany and Israel. Even allowing for the unique Indian 
condition of who the hostage is related to being an input 
into the situation. the Government appeared to have no 
answer except constant capitulation. It is time an Indian 
hostage policy was evolved. To do so it is essential first 
to look, into all aspects related to a hostage situation. 
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